

**Installation Manual
For
PSCBR modules**

Series PSCBR-C-10

Installation manual for devices PSCBR-C-10, PSCBR-C-10-SDM1, PSCBR-C-10-SDM1-1, PSCBR-C-10-SDM2, PSCBR-C-10-SDM2-2, and the related extension modules PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO, PSCBR-E-33-12DI-2DIO-8RO and PSCBR-F

Note:

The German version if the original version of the installation manual

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Subject to change without prior notification

The contents of this documentation has been collated with greatest care and corresponds with our present status of information.

However, we would like to point out, that this document cannot always be updated at the same time as the technical further development of the products.

Information and specifications can be changed at any time. Please keep yourself informed about the current version under www.schmersal.com.br

Devices of the

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1 Important notes

Definition of individual target groups

Project engineers for safe drive systems:
Engineers and technicians

Assembly, electric installation, maintenance and replacement of devices:
Maintenance electricians and service technicians

Commissioning, operation and configuration:
Technicians and engineers

1.1 Definitions

The designation PSCBR is used as generic term for all derivatives from the PSCBR product range. Wherever this description refers to a certain derivative, the complete designation is used.

The term "safe" used in the following text in any case refers to the classification as a safe function for application up to Pl e acc. to EN ISO 13849-1 or SIL3 acc. to EN 61508.

The system software "SafePLC" serves the purpose of configuring and programming PSCBR modules.

The modules of the PSCBR series are internally built up of two independent processing units. In the following these are referred to as system A and system B.

1.2 Co-valid documents

<i>Description</i>	<i>Reference</i>
Configuration of the PSCBR module for stand-alone applications without field-bus interfacing with the program "SafePLC"	SafePLC programming manual (System CD)
Validation report for implemented parameterization and PLC-program	Safety inspection with acceptance protocol
Acceptance test for general safety related applications	Certificate for type approval test for fail-safe control system acc. to machine directive 2006/42/EC for the product groups PSCBR-C-10 PSCBR-C-10-SDM1 PSCBR-C-10-SDM1-2 PSCBR-C-10-SDM2 PSCBR-C-10-SDM2-2 PSCBR-C-10-SDM2A
Acceptance test for applications in elevator technology (validity range EN 81)	Certificate for type approval test as PESSRAL acc. to EN91-1 for the product groups PSCBR-C-10/P PSCBR-C-10-SDM1/P

Note:

- Thoroughly read the manuals before you start the installation and the commissioning of the PSCBR module.
- Paying attention to the documentation is a prerequisite for trouble-free operation and fulfilment of possible warranty claims.

1.3 Abbreviations used

<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
AC	Alternating voltage
IL	Instruction list
ELIA	Employer's liability insurance association
CLK	Clock (cycle)

Abbreviation	Meaning
CPU	Central Processing Unit
DC	Direct voltage
DI1..DI14	Digital Input
DIN	Deutsches Institut für Normung (German Institute for Standardization)
DO	Digital Output
EMU	Emergency Monitoring Unit
EMC	Electromagnetic compatibility
ELC	Emergency Limit Control
EN	European Standard
HISIDE	Output with 24VDC nominal level switching to plus
IP20	Degree of protection for housing
ISO	International Organisation for Standardisation
LED	Light Emitting Diode
LOSIDE	Output switching to reference potential
OLC	Operational Limit Control
PIA	Process image of outputs
PII	Process image of inputs
PESSRAL	Programmable electronic system in safety related applications for elevators
P1,P2	Pulse outputs
PLC	Programmable Logic Controller
POR	Power on Reset
PSC	Position Supervision Control
SELV	Safety Extra Low Voltage
SSI	Synchronous Serial Interface
VDE	Verband der Elektrotechnik, Elektronik und Informationstechnik e. V. (association for electrical engineering, electronics and information technology)

2 Safety regulations

2.1 Intended use

Devices of the PSCBR-C-10/11/12 series are programmable fail-safe control system intended for the establishment of emergency shut-down features and functions. The devices are intended for use in

- EMERGENCY STOP facilities,
- as safety component as defined by the EC machine directive 2006/42/EC,
- as PES for risk reduction as defined by EN 61508,
- in safety circuits acc. to EN 60204 and EN 60204-32,
- as PES for functional safety as defined by EN 62061,
- as SRP/CS as defined by EN 13849,
- as device for establishing the safety functions acc. to EN 61800-5-2,
- as logic unit for converting and processing signals in two-hand control acc. to EN 574.

The devices PSCBR-C-10/P and PSCBR-C-10-SDM1/P are suitable for use as PESSRAL (programmable electronic system in safety related applications for elevators) in elevator technology, i.e in the validity range of EN81-1. Devices of the basic series without the extension "/P" cannot be used in this field of application.

Warning:

Devices of the basic series without the extension "/P" cannot be used in this field of application of EN81-1!



The devices of series PSCBR-C-10/11/12 incl. the extension module PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO are safety components as specified in appendix IV of the EC machine directive 2006/42/EC.

They were developed, designed and manufactured in compliance with the above mentioned directive as well as the EC-directive EC-EMC directive 2004/108/EC

See appendix "EC Declaration of Conformity"

2.2 Use in regions with UL/CSA requirements

Modules of the PSCBR-series can be used in the USA and Canada when observing the following boundary conditions:

- the switching voltage of the output relays must be limited to max. 24 V.
- a power supply unit meeting the requirement CLASS 2 acc. to UL 1310 must be used for supplying electric power to the PSCBR modules and their inputs and outputs

Under these prerequisites no UL/CSA approval is required and the PSCBR-series can be used in switchgear in accordance with UL 508A.

2.3 General safety regulations

Safety note:

- In order to avoid damage to persons and property only qualified personnel is entitled to work on the device. The term qualified personnel refers to persons who have successfully completed electrotechnical training and are fully familiar with the applicable rules and standards of electrical engineering.

The qualified person must become familiar with the operating instructions (see IEC364, DIN VDE0100).

- The qualified must have profound knowledge of the national accident prevention regulations
- The use of the device must be strictly limited to the intended use as specified in the following list. The values of data listed under section "3.2 Characteristic device data" must also be observed.
- The contents of this installation manual is restricted to the basic function of the device or its installation. The "Programming instructions PSCBR-C-10/11/12" contains a more detailed description of the programming and re-parameterization of the devices. Exact knowledge and understanding of these instructions is mandatory for a new installation or modification of device functions or device parameters.
- Commissioning (i.e. starting up the intended operation) is only permitted in strict compliance with the EMC-directive. The EMC-testing regulations EN55011:2007 + A2:2007 and EN 61000-6-2:2005 are used as basis.
- Compliance with the conditions acc. to EN 60068-2-6 related to the values specified under "Technical characteristics" is mandatory for storage and transport.
- The wiring and connecting instructions in chapter "Installation" must be strictly followed.
- The applicable VDE-regulations and other special safety regulations of relevance for the application must be strictly followed.
- Evidence of the configured monitoring functions as well as their parameters and links must be issued by means of a validation report.
- The implementation of the module must be coordinated with the demands of the responsible acceptance testing authority (e.g. TÜV or ELIA).
- Do not install or operate damaged products. Report damages immediately to the responsible forwarding agent.
- Never open the housing and/or make unauthorized conversions.
- Inputs and outputs for standard functions or digital and analog data transmitted via communication modules must not be used for safety relevant applications.

WARNING:

Using our devices contrary to the rules and conditions specified hereunder can lead to injuries or fatalities as well as damage to connected devices and machines! This will also cause the loss of all warranty and compensation claims against Schmersal.

2.4 Operation and service

The module must always be de-energized before installation and removal, or before disconnecting signal lines. For this purpose all live supply lines to the device must be checked for safe isolation from supply

When installing or removing the module appropriate measures must be applied to prevent electrostatic discharge to the externally arranged terminal and plug connections. Contact with such terminals should be reduced to a minimum and earthing should by means of e.g. an earthing strap should take place before and during these procedures.

2.5 Transport/storage

Information concerning transport, storage and proper handling must be strictly followed. The climate related specifications in chapter "Technical data" must be complied with.

3 Device types

The series PSCBR-C-10/11/12 consists of

- the basic devices PSCBR-C-10/11/11-2/12/12A/12-2
- the extension modules PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO
- the communication modules PSCBR-F/52/53

Basic devices

Series PSCBR-C-10/11/12 is a compact fail-safe control system with optionally integrated drive monitoring for one (PSCBR-C-10-SDM1/11-2) or two (PSCBR-C-10-SDM2/12-2) axes. The device is freely programmable for reliable processing of both EMERGENCY STOP button, two-hand control, light grid, operation mode switch, etc., but also of drive related safety functions. Pre-configured modules for safety relevant signal pre-processing are available for a vast number of input devices. The same applies for safety functions serving the purpose of drive monitoring. Detailed information can be found in the programming manual.

The basic version of the device has 14 safe inputs and 3 cut-off channels, which can be extended to max. 65 safe I/O's.

Single encoder solutions (incl. TTL/HTL, SIN(COS), Proxi-Sw.) as well as two encoder solutions (e.g. Inc.-TTL or SSI and Inc.-HTL) are supported for reliable speed and/or position detection.

Extension modules

Digital I/O extension for PSCBR-C-10/11/12 series.

The extension module has 12 safe inputs, 10 safe I/O for optional configuration as input or output and 2 signal outputs.


Communication modules

Extension module for the transfer of diagnostic and status data to an imposed control by means of standard field bus.

3.1 Characteristic data of device

3.1.1 Basic modules

3.1.1.1 PSCBR-C-10

<i>Type designation</i>	<i>Device design</i>
	<p>Design of module with the following periphery:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 14 digital inputs 2 pulse outputs 2 relay outputs 2 LOSIDE 2 HISIDE 2 signal outputs 1 diagnostic and configuration interface 1 function button 1 7-segment display 1 status LED 14 status LEDs for inputs 2 status LEDs for pulse outputs 2 status LEDs for relay outputs 2 status LEDs for HISIDE 1 backplane bus interface


Characteristics of the module:

- Logic processing up to PI e acc. to EN ISO 13849-1 or SIL 3 acc. to EN 61508
- Freely programmable small control system for up to 800 IL instructions
- Logic diagram oriented programming
- Pulse outputs for cross-shortening detection of digital input signals
- Safety function of external contact monitoring for connected switchgear
- Monitored relay outputs for safety relevant functions
- Monitored HISIDE/LOSIDE outputs for safety relevant functions
- CAN-communication in connection with the PSCBR-F for diagnose via backplane bus system mounted on top-hat rail.

Technical characteristic data

Safety related characteristic data	
PI acc. to EN 13849	PI e
PFH / architecture	$3,0 * 10^{-9}$ / architecture class 4
SIL acc. to EN 61508	SIL 3
Proof test interval	20 years = max. utilization period
General data	
Max. number of extension modules	2
Interface for extension modules	T-bus connector, pluggable in top-hat rail
Safe digital I	14 incl. 8 OSSD
Safe digital I/O	-
Safe digital Out	2
Safe analog In	-
Safe relay outputs	1
Signal outputs	2
Pulse outputs	2
Type of connection	Clamp-type terminals
Electrical data	
Supply voltage	24 VDC / 2A
Tolerance	-15%, +20%
Power consumption	2.4 W
Ratings digital I	24 VDC; 20 mA, Type1 acc. to EN61131-2
Ratings digital O	24VDC; 250 mA
Ratings relays	24 VDC/2A 230 VAC/2A
Pulse outputs	Max. 250 mA
Supply voltage fuse protection	Max. 2 A
Environmental data	
Temperature	0° to 50° operating temp.; -10° to +70 ° storage temp.
Class of protection	IP 52
Climatic category	3 acc. to DIN 50 178
EMC	In accordance with EN 55011 and EN 61000-6-2
Mechanical data	
Dimensions (HxDxW [mm])	100x115x45
Weight	300 g
Fastening	To snap on standard rail
Max. conductor size	1.5 mm ²

3.1.1.2 PSCBR-C-10-SDM1

<i>Type designation</i>	<i>Device design</i>
	<p>Design of module with the following periphery:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 sensor interface 14 digital inputs, alternatively 4 counting inputs 2 pulse outputs 2 relay outputs 2 LOSIDE 2 HISIDE 2 signal outputs 1 diagnostic and configuration interface 1 function button 1 7-segment display 1 status LED 14 status LEDs for inputs 2 status LEDs for pulse outputs 2 status LEDs for relay outputs 2 status LEDs for HISIDE 1 backplane bus interface


Characteristics of the module:

- Logic processing up to PI e EN ISO 13849-1 or SIL 3 acc. to EN 61508.
- Movement monitoring of one axis up to PI e EN ISO 13849-1 or SIL 3 acc. to EN 61508
- Speed monitoring:
- RPM-monitoring
- standstill monitoring
- Sense of rotation monitoring
- Safe incremental dimension
- Emergency Stop monitoring
- Position monitoring
- Position range monitoring
- Trend range monitoring
- Target position monitoring
- Freely programmable small control system for up to 800 IL instructions
- Logic diagram oriented programming
- Pulse outputs for cross-shorting detection of digital input signals
- Counting inputs as alternatives to the digital inputs
- Safety function of external contact monitoring for connected switchgear
- Monitored relay outputs for safety relevant functions
- Monitored HISIDE/LOWSIDE outputs for safety relevant functions
- CAN-communication in connection with the PSCBR-F for diagnose via backplane bus system mounted on top-hat rail.

Technical characteristic data

Safety related characteristic data	
PI acc. to EN 13849	PI e
PFH / architecture	$2,2 * 10^{-9}$ / architecture class 4
SIL acc. to EN 61508	SIL 3
Proof test interval	20 years = max. utilization period
General data	
Max. number of extension modules	2
Interface for extension modules	T-bus connector, pluggable in top-hat rail
Safe digital I	14 incl. 8 OSSD
Safe digital I/O	-
Safe digital Out	2
Safe analog In	-
Safe relay outputs	1
Signal outputs	2
Pulse outputs	2
Type of connection	Clamp-type terminals
Axis monitoring	1 axis
Encoder interface front number / technology	1 / SSI; SIN/COS; Incr.-TTL
Max. frequency SIN/COS, Incr. TTL	200 kHz
Cycle frequency/mode SSI	Master mode 150 kHz / Slave mode max. 250 kHz
Type of connection	D-SUB 9pole
Encoder interface terminals number / technology	1 / Proxi-Sw.; Inc.-HTL
Max. frequency Proxi	10 kHz
Type of connection	Clamp-type terminals
Electrical data	
Supply voltage	24 VDC / 2A
Tolerance	-15%, +20%
Power consumption	2.4 W
Ratings digital I	24 VDC; 20 mA, Type1 acc. to EN61131-2
Ratings digital O	24VDC; 250 mA
Ratings relays	24 VDC/2A 230 VAC/2A
Pulse outputs	Max. 250 mA
Supply voltage fuse protection	Max. 2 A
Environmental data	
Temperature	0° to 50° operating temp.; -10° to +70 ° storage temp.
Class of protection	IP 52
Climatic category	3 acc. to DIN 50 178
EMC	In accordance with EN 55011 and EN 61000-6-2
Mechanical data	
Dimensions (HxDxW [mm])	100x115x45
Weight	310 g
Fastening	To snap on standard rail
Max. conductor size	1.5 mm ²

3.1.1.3 PSCBR-C-10-SDM2

Type designation	Device design
 <p>The image shows the front panel of the PSCBR-C-10-SDM2 module. It features a yellow top section with terminal blocks X11-X16 and X21-X26. A central display shows the number '4'. Below the display are two sensor interfaces, X31 and X32, and a COM X41 port. The bottom section is black and contains a 'PROTECT PSCBR PSCBR-C-10-SDM2' label.</p>	<p>Design of module with the following periphery:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2 sensor interfaces 14 digital inputs, alternatively 4 counting inputs 2 pulse outputs 2 relay outputs 2 LOSIDE 2 HISIDE 2 signal outputs 1 diagnostic and configuration interface 1 function button 1 7-segment display 1 status LED 14 status LEDs for inputs 2 status LEDs for pulse outputs 2 status LEDs for relay outputs 2 status LEDs for HISIDE 1 backplane bus interface

Characteristics of the module:


- Logic processing up to PI e EN ISO 13849-1 or SIL 3 acc. to EN 61508.
- Movement monitoring of one or two axes up to PI e EN ISO 13849-1 or SIL 3 acc. to EN 61508
- Speed monitoring
- RPM-monitoring
- standstill monitoring
- Sense of rotation monitoring
- Safe incremental dimension
- Emergency Stop monitoring
- Position monitoring
- Position range monitoring
- Trend range monitoring
- Target position monitoring
- Freely programmable small control system for up to 800 IL instructions
- Logic diagram oriented programming
- Pulse outputs for cross-shorting detection of digital input signals
- Counting inputs as alternatives to the digital inputs
- Safety function of external contact monitoring for connected switchgear
- Monitored relay outputs for safety relevant functions
- Monitored HISIDE/LOWSIDE outputs for safety relevant functions
- CAN-communication in connection with the PSCBR-F for diagnose via backplane bus system
- Assembly on top hat rail

Technical characteristic data

Safety related characteristic data	
PI acc. to EN 13849	PI e
PFH / architecture	$6,2 * 10^{-9}$ architecture class 4
SIL acc. to EN 61508	SIL 3
Proof test interval	20 years = max. utilization period
General data	
Max. number of extension modules	2
Interface for extension modules	T-bus connector, pluggable in top-hat rail
Safe digital I	14 incl. 8 OSSD
Safe digital I/O	-
Safe digital Out	2
Safe analog In	-
Safe relay outputs	1
Signal outputs	2
Pulse outputs	2
Type of connection	Clamp-type terminals
Axis monitoring	1 axis
Encoder interface front number / technology	2 / SSI; SIN/COS; Incr.-TTL
Max. frequency SIN/COS, Incr. TTL	200 kHz
Cycle frequency/mode SSI	Master mode 150 kHz / Slave mode max. 250 kHz
Type of connection	D-SUB 9pole
Encoder interface terminals number / technology	2 / Proxi-Sw.; Inc.-HTL
Max. frequency Proxi	10 kHz
Type of connection	Clamp-type terminals
Electrical data	
Supply voltage	24 VDC / 2A
Tolerance	-15%, +20%
Power consumption	2.4 W
Ratings digital I	24 VDC; 20 mA, Type1 acc. to EN61131-2
Ratings digital O	24VDC; 250 mA
Ratings relays	24 VDC/2A 230 VAC/2A
Pulse outputs	Max. 250 mA
Supply voltage fuse protection	Max. 2 A
Environmental data	
Temperature	0° to 50° operating temp.; -10° to +70 ° storage temp.
Class of protection	IP 52
Climatic category	3 acc. to DIN 50 178
EMC	In accordance with EN 55011 and EN 61000-6-2
Mechanical data	
Dimensions (HxDxW [mm])	100x115x67.5
Weight	390 g
Fastening	To snap on standard rail
Max. conductor size	1.5 mm ²

Extension modules

3.1.1.4 PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO

<i>Type designation</i>	<i>Device design</i>
	<p>Design of module with the following periphery:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 12 digital inputs 10 I/O optionally configurable as input or output 2 pulse outputs 2 signal outputs 12 status LEDs for inputs 10 status LEDs for I/O 1 backplane bus interface

Characteristics of the module:

- 12 safe inputs; 8 of these OSSD compatible
- 10 safe I/O optionally configurable as input or output,
- Cross-shorting monitoring
- Possibility of contact multiplication or contact amplification by means of external contactors in connection with integrated monitoring
- Extensive diagnostics functions integrated in FW
- Power supply via basic module
- Assembly on top hat rail


Technical characteristic data:

Safety related characteristic data	
PI acc. to EN 13849	PI e
PFH / architecture	Type 2.6 * 10 ^{-9 1)} / Class 4
SIL acc. to EN 61508	SIL 3
Proof test interval	20 years = max. utilization period
General data	
Safe digital I	12 incl. 8 OSSD
Safe digital I/O	10
Safe digital Out	-
Safe analog In	-
Safe relay outputs	-
Signal outputs	2
Pulse outputs	2
Type of connection	Clamp-type terminals
Electrical data	
Power consumption	Max. 3.8 W
Ratings digital I	24 VDC; 20 mA, Type1 acc. to EN61131-2
Ratings digital O	24VDC; 250 mA
Pulse outputs	Max. 250 mA
Environmental data	
Temperature	0° to 50° operating temp.; -10° to +70 ° storage temp.
Class of protection	IP 52
Climatic category	3 acc. to DIN 50 178
EMC	In accordance with EN 55011 and EN 61000-6-2
Mechanical data	
Dimensions (HxDxW [mm])	100x115x45
Weight	300 g
Fastening	To snap on standard rail
Max. conductor size	1.5 mm ²

1) Value applies only for extension module. For a total assessment in accordance with EN 13849 one must use a series connection with the corresponding basic device => $PFH_{Logic} = PFH_{Basic} + PFH_{Extension}$

3.1.2 Communication modules

3.1.2.1 PSCBR-F

<i>Type designation</i>	<i>Device design</i>
 <p>The image shows a black, rectangular communication module mounted on a rail. It features a green 'CAN' label, a 'COM 1' port, and a 'PSC-BR' label. A yellow label at the bottom reads 'SCHMERSAL PROTECT PSCBR PSCBR-F-CAN'.</p>	<p>Design of module with the following periphery:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 CAN-BUS interface – PSCBR-F or CANopen – PSCBR-F-PB or Profibus – PSCBR53 1 backplane bus interface 1 status LED for operating status 1 status LED CAN-communication

Characteristics of the module:

- Communication module CAN or CANopen or Profibus
- 2 x 64 bit PAE with selectable assignment by means of function module
- 64 bit digital data such as input or output states, intermediate results of the logic, safety function related result data can be selected.
- Position and/or speed and/or analog input value ¹⁾ in form of analog data, limited to max. 64 bit, can be selected.
- Use as unsafe messaging channel
- CAN-communication via backplane bus
- Assembly on top hat rail

¹⁾ only PSCBR-C-10-SDM2A

Technical characteristic data:

Safety related characteristic data	
PI acc. to EN 13849	n.a.
PFH / architecture	n.a.
SIL acc. to EN 61508	n.a.
Proof test interval	n.a.
General data	
Field bus interface	1
Type of connection	Standard acc. to field bus type
Max. size of digital data in PAE	64 bit
Max. size of analog data in PAE	64 bit
Type Update time for data	16 ms
Electrical data	
Power consumption	Max. 2.4 W
Field bus ratings	Standard acc. to field bus type
Environmental data	
Temperature	0° to 50° operating temp.; -10° to +70 ° storage temp.
Class of protection	IP 52
Climatic category	3 acc. to DIN 50 178
EMC	In accordance with EN 55011 and EN 61000-6-2
Mechanical data	
Dimensions (HxDxW [mm])	100x115x22.5
Weight	110 g
Fastening	To snap on standard rail

3.2 Identification

The type plate is located on the left side wall of the module and contains the following information:

- Type designation
- Part number
- Serial number
- Identification of hardware release
- Identification of software release
- Safety category
- Input characteristics
- Output characteristics
- Date of manufacture (week/year)

3.3 Scope of delivery

The scope of delivery contains:

PSCBR module:

- Plug for all signal terminals without encoder connection

Not included in the scope of delivery:


- SafePLC configuration software CD with
 - Installation manual
 - Programming manual
 - Driver for programming adapter
- Programming adapter
- Licence key (USB-Dongle) for SafePLC
- System CD with manuals
- Backplane bus plug (PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO and use of monitoring module)

4 Safety related characteristics


4.1 General design, safety related architecture and characteristic data

The internal structure of the PSCBR-series consists of two separate channels with reciprocal comparison of results. High quality diagnoses for fault detection are made in each of the two channels.

With respect to architecture and function the internal structure corresponds with category 4 of EN 13849-1.



The overall architecture therefore corresponds with the following structure:



The specific safety related characteristic data of the corresponding module can be taken from the technical characteristic data in chapter 3.

The characteristic data specified in chapter 3 (e.g. PI e and PFH-value acc. to table as evidence acc. to EN 13849) for the partial system PES can be used for the safety related assessment of the overall system.

Characteristic data:

Max. obtainable safety class	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SIL 3 acc. to EN61508 • Category 4 acc. to EN945-1 • Performance-Level e acc. to EN ISO 13849-1
System structure	2-channel with diagnose (/1002) acc. to EN 61508 Architecture category 4 acc. to EN 13849
Rating of operating mode	"high demand" acc. to EN 61508 (high demand rate)
Probability of an endangering failure per hour (PFH-value)	PSCBR-C-10, PSCBR-C-10-SDM1, PSCBR-C-10-SDM2 und PSCBR-C-10-SDM2A < 1,4 E-8 (14FIT) Specific values acc. to table "techn. characteristic data" Characteristic data
Proof-Test-Interval (EN61508)	20 years, after this time the module must be replaced

Safety note:

- The specific safety related characteristic data of the corresponding module can be taken from the technical characteristic data in chapter 3.
- When using several sensors with different functions (e.g. position indicator access door + speed detection) for a safety function (e.g. safe reduced speed when access door is open), these must be assumed as being connected in series for the safety related assessment of the overall system. See also exemplary calculation in appendix.
- The safety regulations and EMC-directives must be strictly followed.
- Concerning the applicable fault exclusions please refer to the tables under D in the appendix of EN 13849-2.
- The characteristic data specified in chapter 3 for the partial system PES (e.g. PI e and PFH-value acc. to table as evidence acc. to EN 13849) can be used for the safety related assessment of the overall system.

The following examples and their characteristic architecture are mainly responsible for the assignment to a category acc. to EN ISO 13849-1.

The maximum possible Performance Levels acc. to EN 13849 resulting from this still depend on the following factors of the external components:

- Structure (simple or redundant)
- Detection of common cause faults (CCF)
- Degree of diagnostic coverage on request (DC_{avg})
- Mean time to dangerous failure of a channel ($MTTF_d$)


4.2 Safety related characteristic data and wiring for the connected sensors

The PSCBR modules have completely separated signal processing paths for each safety input. This applies for both the digital and the analog inputs. Furthermore, measures for achieving the highest possible DC-values have been implemented.


4.2.1 Digital sensors:

Digital inputs and outputs are generally of a completely redundant design, except the electromagnetic input terminal. The following list contains details for classification, the DC and the achievable PI or SIL.


4.2.1.1 Characteristics of sensors / input elements



Two-channel input element in parallel connection (Cat. fault tolerance 1) with high DC caused by signal processing in two channels and diagnose by means of cross-comparison in the PES



Two-channel input element in series connection (Cat. 4, fault tolerance 1) with low to medium DC caused by signal processing in two channels and diagnose by means of cyclic testing



Single channel input element and dual channel processing with low to medium DC by signal processing in two channels and diagnose by means of cyclic testing, PI / SIL depending on permissible fault exclusions and test rate for input element.

4.2.1.2 DC digital sensors/inputs

The PSCBR modules ensure far reaching diagnostics functions for the input element. These are carried out permanently, or optionally (cross-shortening monitoring by means of pulse identifier, cross-comparison, 2- or multi-channel sensor with/without time-out, start-up test).

Permanently active diagnostics functions:

Cross-comparison:

PSCBR module inputs are in general internally designed with two channels. The status of input signals is permanently compared crosswise. Only with High signals in both partial input systems the input is considered a High input, should the signal level deviate between both channels, the input is set to Low state.

Dynamic test of the partial input system switching threshold:

The switching thresholds for detecting the High level are tested cyclically with a high cycle rate. Falling below the defined threshold value a module triggers a module alarm.

Dynamic test of the input system's switchability:

The switchability of the input system to Low level is tested for all inputs with a high rate, except DI5 -- DI8. Falling below the defined threshold value a module triggers a module alarm.

Diagnostics functions to be activated by parameterization:

Cross-shortening test:

The PSCBR modules have pulse signal outputs, identified by an unambiguous signature. When performing the cross-shortening test the switching elements of the digital sensors / input elements are supplied with auxiliary voltage by the PSCBR-module via the pulse signal outputs. The signature is thus stamped on the High signal level of the sensors / input elements and checked by the PSCBR module. With the signature test short-circuits and cross-shortening to High signals can be recognized. With alternating use of the pulse signals of multi-contacts, parallel signal lines or adjacent terminal assignment, cross-shortening between the respective input elements is detected.

Sensors / input elements with 2- or multi-pole contacts without time-out.

Several contacts can be assigned to the sensors / input elements. These are therefore compatible with at least 2-channel elements. A High level of the sensor/input element requires a logic series connection of both contacts.

Example 1:

Input element with 2 normally closed contacts: High level when both contacts are closed.

Example 2:

Input element with 1 normally closed and 1 normally open contact: High level when normally open contact is actuated and normally closed contact is not actuated.

Sensors / input elements with 2- or multi-pole contacts with time-out.

Same test as before, but additional monitoring of the input signals for compliance with the defined level connections within a time window of 0.5 seconds. Defining the levels over a time period of > 0.5 seconds triggers a module alarm.

Start test:

Each time the safety module (=PSCBR module) is switched on, the input element must be tested in direction of the Low signal status (defined Safe State), e.g. by actuating the Emergency Stop button or a door lock after the system has been started.

Operational / organizational tests:

Apart from the previously mentioned diagnostic measures for the PSCBR modules, cyclic testing can be performed within the application. These tests can also be used when assessing the DC.

Note:

Operational/organizational tests can also be used for a combination of hardware inputs and functional inputs (input information transferred via standard field bus). However, an exclusive use of functional inputs is ruled out in this context (combination of two or more functional inputs).

The PSCBR modules therefore ensure far reaching diagnostics functions for the partial input system. These are performed permanently or optionally (cross-shortening monitoring by means of pulse identifier).

The following diagnoses for input sensors can generally be used for the safety related assessment of the entire system:

Input element characteristic	Parameterized / operational tests				DC	Definition of measure	Note
	Cross-shorting test	With time-out	Start test	Cyclic test during operation			
Single-channel			O	O	>60	Cyclic test pulse by dynamic change of input signals	A sufficiently high test rate must be ensured.
	X				90	Cyclic test pulse by dynamic change of input signals	Only effective if pulse assignment is active
	X		O	O	90-99	Cyclic test pulse by dynamic change of input signals	DC depending on frequency of start / cyclic test DC = 90 test only in > 4 week intervals DC = 99 test at least 1 x day / or 100-time request rate
Dual channel					90	Cross-comparison of input signals with dynamic test, if short-circuits cannot be detected (for multiple inputs/outputs)	For fault exclusion short-circuit up to DC=99 possible
			O	O	90-99	Cyclic test pulse by dynamic change of input signals	DC depending on frequency of start / cyclic test
	X				99	Cross-comparison of input signals with immediate and intermediate results in the logic (L) and temporal as well as logic program sequence monitoring and detection of static failures and short circuits (for multiple inputs/outputs).	Only effective if pulse assignment is active
		X			99	Plausibility test, e.g. use of normally open and normally closed contacts = non-equivalent signal comparison of input elements.	Only effective in connection with activated time-out function for input element

⚠ Safety note:

- The manufacturer's data (MTTFD, FIT-numbers, etc.) must be used for a safety related assessment of the partial system "Sensors".
- The DC-values listed in the table must be used conservatively and compliance with the boundary conditions (see table under "Remarks") must be ensured.
- According to the applicable standards, fault exclusions are permitted. The boundary conditions mentioned in this context must permanently be met.
- If several sensor systems are required for the correct function of a single safety function, their partial values must be correctly merged by following the chosen method.

4.2.1.3 Classification of digital inputs

4.2.1.3.1 Basic inputs D1 ... D14

Digital inputs	Achievable performance level	Comment
DI1 ... DI4 DI9 ... DI12	PL e	Suitable for any kind of input elements, with / without pulse, achievable PI depending on the $MTTF_d$ of the input element, as well as fault exclusions in the external wiring.
DI5 ... DI8	PL e	Single-channel with pulse: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mainly High level required ($T_{High} > 100 * T_{Low}$) - At least one request/day required by application - Fault detection upon request
	PL d	Single-channel without pulse: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fault exclusion short-circuit between signals and to VCC - Fault detection upon request
	PL e	Dual channel: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - At least one request/day required by application - Fault detection upon request
DI13, DI14	PL e	Use of pulse1 and pulse2
	PI d	Without pulse / with pulse1 or 2 on both inputs Fault detection upon request

4.2.1.3.2 Expansion inputs EAE1 ... EAE10

Digital inputs	Achievable performance level	Comment
EAE1 ... EAE10 (only PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO)		Without pulse, single channel static signal -> auxiliary input
	PL e	Without pulse, dual channel static signal - At least one request/day required by application - Fault detection only upon request
	PL d	Without pulse, dual channel static signal - Less than one request/day required by application
	PL e	Single-channel with pulse - Mainly High level required ($T_{High} > 100 * T_{Low}$) - At least one request/day required by application - Fault detection only upon request
	PL d	Single-channel with pulse - Less than one request/day
	PL e	Dual channel with pulse1 and pulse2

Note: The achievable PI for a combination of HW-inputs and functional inputs depends on the chosen operational/organizational tests as well as on the independence of both channels in the system structure. The determination of the PI requires an application related analysis.

4.2.1.4 Exemplary connections of digital sensors

4.2.1.4.1 Single-channel sensor, without cross-shorting test




Fig.: Single-channel sensor, without cross-shorting test

The single-channel sensor is connected to the PSCBR without clocking or without cross-shorting test. This design is not recommended for safety applications. PI b acc. to EN ISO 13849-1 can maximally be reached.

4.2.1.4.2 Single-channel sensor with cross-shorting test




Fig.: Single-channel sensor with cross-shorting test

When using a single-channel sensor with clock one output is connected to the clock output P1 or P2. The clock must subsequently be assigned to the PSCBR.

The use of a single-channel sensor with clock detects:

short-circuit to supply voltage DC 24 V
short-circuit to DC 0 V
cable interruption (current interruption is safe state!)

However, be cautious in case of a cable short between the two sensor connections, because this is not detected! A short-circuit between P1 and DI1 is also not detected.

Due to the single-channel character of the switching element / sensor its failure requires an fault exclusion. This is permissible when using positively disconnecting switches with correct constrained actuation.

A series connection of 2 switching elements with corresponding fault exclusion of a double fault is on equal footing with the application. These may be e.g. the safety outputs of an electronic monitoring device (light curtain, switching mat) with internal dual-channel switch-off.

PL d acc. to EN ISO 13849-1 can be achieved by using a suitable switching element and with cautious wiring of the sensor. In special cases, i.e. in connection with suitable switching elements and permissible fault exclusions one may also achieve PL e as per EN ISO 13849-1.

 **Safety note:**

- PL e or higher acc. to EN ISO 13849-1 is achieved if the short-circuit between input and associated pulse output as well as the short-circuit between the sensor connections can be excluded. Here one must take care that in a fault scenario the switch must be positively opening in accordance with EN 60947-5-1.. The sensor must additionally be triggered in regular intervals and the safety function requested. Fault exclusions can be achieved in accordance with EN ISO 13849-2 table D8. In case of single-channel use of the inputs, the achievable safety level must be limited to SIL 2 or PL d, if the safety function is demanded at regular intervals.
- A series connection of 2 switching elements with fault exclusion for double fault requires testing of the suitability in accordance with the intended safety level of this element. We would like to draw your attention to the applicable regulations in the EC machine directive 2006/42/EC.
- For single-channel sensors a safety related use of the inputs is only intended in connection with the pulse outputs.

4.2.1.4.3 Dual-channel sensor without timeout with cross-shorting test

Faults are at least detected when requested. The DC is medium and by using cyclic tests (start test, operational/organizational tests) can be changed up to high level. depending on the test frequency.

Only normally closed contacts should be used for safety related applications.

PI d acc. to EN 13849-1 can be achieved when using sensors / switching elements with fault exclusion for not opening the switch contacts. This is permissible when using positively disconnecting switches with correct constrained actuation. The use of sensors with self-monitoring output contacts is also permitted.

PI e in accordance with EN 13849-1 can be achieved when using heterogeneous sensors / input elements with sufficiently high MTTFd in connection with temporal plausibility monitoring and a sufficiently high change of the switching state = dynamic testing.




Figure: dual-channel sensor homogeneous without cycling, with positive disconnection




Figure: dual-channel input element heterogeneous, without cycling

 **Safety note:**

- Pl d or higher in accordance with EN ISO 13849-1 is achieved by using switching elements / sensors with positively opening contacts or positive actuation acc. to EN 60947-5-1
- Using devices for which the fault exclusion double fault for the intended safety level can be specified for the switching elements, is permitted. We would like to draw your attention to the applicable regulations in the EC machine directive 2006/42/EC.

4.2.1.4.4 Dual-channel sensor with time-out and cross-shorting test

Cross-shorting as well as connections to DC 24 V and DC 0 V can be detected by using two independent clock signals on the homogeneous sensor.

Only normally closed contacts should be used for safety related applications.

PI d or higher acc. to EN 13849-1 can be achieved when using sensors / switching elements with fault exclusion for not opening the switch contacts. This is permissible when using positively disconnecting switches with correct constrained actuation. The use of sensors with self-monitoring output contacts is also permitted.




Figure: two-channel sensor, homogeneous with clock

Safety note:

- PI d or higher in accordance with EN ISO 13849-1 is achieved by using switching elements / sensors with positively actuation
- When using two independent sensors with independent actuation, PI d or higher acc. to EN ISO 13849-1 can be achieved.
- When using common elements in the actuation chain, an fault exclusion is required for this purpose. The corresponding limitations and criteria acc. to EN 13849-1 must be observed.

4.2.1.4.5 Dual-channel sensor with time-out and cross-shorting test

Cross-shorting as well as connections to DC 24 V and DC 0 V can be detected by using two independent clock signals on the homogeneous sensor.

PI d or higher acc. to EN 13849-1 can be achieved when:

- using sensors / switching elements with positive actuation.
- using 2 sensors / switching elements with independent actuation.
- dto. However, with actuation through a common actuating device in connection with an fault exclusion for this device.




Figure: two-channel sensor, homogeneous with clock

Safety note:

- PI d or higher in accordance with EN ISO 13849-1 is achieved by using switching elements / sensors with positively actuation
- When using two independent sensors with independent actuation, PI d or higher acc. To EN ISO 13849-1 can be achieved.
- When using common elements in the actuation chain, an fault exclusion is required for this purpose. The corresponding limitations and criteria acc. to EN 13849-1 must be observed.

4.2.1.5 Overview of achievable PI for digital safety inputs

Type of sensor / input element	InPort	Parameterized / operational tests				Achievable PI acc. to EN 13849-1	Fault exclusion for input element	Condition for input element
		Cross-shorting test	With time-out	Start test	Cyclic test during operation			
Single-channel	DI1..D14					b		Operation proven input element
				O	O	d	All faults at the input element Short-circuit at input/signal line	MTTF _D = high Connection in control cabinet or protected routing
	DI1..D4 DI9..DI12					e	All faults at the input element Short-circuit at input/signal line	Input element does not comply with min. PIr Connection in control cabinet or protected routing
		X				d	Getting caught Short-circuit at input/signal line	Mainly High level required (T _{High} > 100 * T _{Low}). Positively disconnecting MTTF _D = high Connection in control cabinet or protected routing
	All	X		O	O	e	All faults at the input element Short-circuit at input/signal line	Input element does not comply with min. PIr Connection in control cabinet or protected routing MTTF _D = high
Dual-channel parallel	All					d	Short-circuit between input/signal line	Connection in control cabinet or protected routing MTTF _D = medium
		X				e		MTTF _D = high
Dual-channel parallel	All		X			e	Short-circuit between input/signal line (only with common switching elements = 2xNO or 2xNC)	Connection in control cabinet or protected routing MTTF _D = high

Type of sensor / input element	InPort	Parameterized / operational tests				Achievable PI acc. to EN 13849-1	Fault exclusion for input element	Condition for input element
		Cross-shorting test	With time-out	Start test	Cyclic test during operation			
Dual-channel	DI1..D4 DI9..DI12					d	Short-circuit at input/signal line Getting caught / positively disconnecting	Connection in control cabinet or protected routing MTTF _D = medium
				O	O	e	Short-circuit at input/signal line	Connection in control cabinet or protected routing MTTF _D = high
	All			O	O	d	Short-circuit at input/signal line	Connection in control cabinet or protected routing MTTF _D = medium
		X		O	O	e		MTTF _D = high


X: Diagnostic measure activated
O: min. 1 diagnostic measure activated

4.2.2 Sensors for speed and/or position detection


4.2.2.1 General safety related structure of the sensor interface for position and/or speed

The basic modules of the PSCBR series can be optionally equipped with one (PSCBR-C-10-SDM1/12) or two encoder interfaces (PSCBR-C-10-SDM1-12/12-2) per axis.

Depending on encoder type and combination, different safety levels can be reached. The following system reflection results for the corresponding partial system:



Dual sensor system with separate signal processing in two channels, diagnose by cross-comparison in the PES



Sensor system with single and dual-channel partial system (example incremental encoder). Diagnose by separate signal processing in two channels and cross-comparison in the PES as well as further specific diagnoses.

4.2.2.2 General diagnostic measures for encoder interface

For fault detection in the sensor system the PSCBR series has a number of diagnostic measures implemented, depending on the chosen encoder type or its combination. These are automatically activated when choosing the encoder type.

With respect to their type and effectiveness diagnostic measures can generally be classified using the following table:

Diagnoses for sensors for position and/or speed detection:

Measure	DC	Note	Use
Cross-comparison of input signals with immediate and intermediate results in the logic (L) and temporal as well as logic program sequence monitoring and detection of static failures and short circuits (for multiple inputs/outputs).	99	Only to be used for: - dual-channel sensor systems (2 separate sensors), - the dual channel partial system of single channel sensors (incremental encoder) - Diagnose for the single and dual channel partial system of specially suitable sensor systems (SIN/COS-encoder, resolver) - Dynamic operation / no standstill monitoring	Monitoring of 2-channel sensor systems or the corresponding partial system of sensors for dynamic operation Not to be used for standstill monitoring!
Cross-comparison of input signals without dynamic test	80-95%	DC depends on the frequency of the dynamic condition, i.e. standstill or movement, as well as on the quality of the monitoring measure (80 – 90 % for incremental encoder, 95 % for SIN/COS-encoder)	Monitoring of 2-channel sensor systems or the corresponding partial system of sensors for non-dynamic operation To be used especially for standstill monitoring!
Monitoring of some features of the sensor (response time, the area of analog signals, e.g. electric resistance, capacity)	60	Diagnose of specific features of sensors, only to be used for speed and position sensors as per chapter 4.3.	Monitoring of the single-channel partial system in single-channel sensor systems

4.2.2.3 Encoder types and their combination, diagnostic data

<i>Type</i> <i>Encoder to interface</i> <i>X31/32</i>	<i>Type</i> <i>Encoder to interface</i> <i>X31/34</i>	<i>Type</i> <i>Encoder to X 23</i>	<i>Safe speed</i>	<i>Safe direction</i>	<i>Safe position</i>	<i>Fault exclusion</i>	<i>DC</i>		
							1-channel partial system	2-channel partial system dynamic	2-channel partial system non-dynamic (standstill monitoring)
NC	NC	1 x Bero + 1 x Bero	X			Fault exclusion mech. shaft breakage, positive encoder shaft connection required, if common elements are in use.	n.a.	99%	80-90%
Incremental	NC	NC	X			Fault exclusion mech. shaft breakage, positive encoder shaft connection required	60%	99%	80-90%
Incremental	Incremental	NC	X	X			n.a.	99%	95%
Incremental	NC	1 x Bero	X				n.a.	99%	90-95%
Incremental	NC	2 x Bero 90°	X	X			n.a.	99%	90-95%
Incremental	SIN/COS	NC	X	X			n.a.	99%	99%
Incremental	HTL	NC	X	X			n.a.	99%	90-95%

Type <i>Encoder to interface X31/32</i>	Type <i>Encoder to interface X31/34</i>	Type <i>Encoder to X 23</i>	Safe speed	Safe direction	Safe position	Fault exclusion	DC		
							1-channel partial system	2-channel partial system dynamic	2-channel partial system non-dynamic (standstill monitoring)
Incremental	Resolver	NC	X	X			n.a.	99%	99%
Incremental	SSI	NC	X	X	X		n.a.	99%	90-95%
SIN/COS	NC	NC	X	X		Fault exclusion mech. shaft breakage, positive encoder shaft connection required	90%	99%	90-95%
SIN/COS	Incremental	NC	X	X			n.a.	99%	95-99%
SIN/COS	NC	1 x Bero	X	X			n.a.	99%	90-95%
SIN/COS	NC	2 x Bero 90°	X	X			n.a.	99%	95-99%
SIN/COS	HTL	NC	X	X			n.a.	99%	95-99%
SIN/COS	Resolver	NC	X	X			n.a.	99%	99%

Type <i>Encoder to interface X31/32</i>	Type <i>Encoder to interface X31/34</i>	Type <i>Encoder to X 23</i>	Safe speed	Safe direction	Safe position	Fault exclusion	DC		
							1-channel partial system	2-channel partial system dynamic	2-channel partial system non-dynamic (standstill monitoring)
SIN/COS	SSI	NC	X	X	X		n.a.	99%	95-99%
SSI	NC	2 x Bero 90°	X	X	X		n.a.	99%	90-95%
SSI	SIN/COS	NC	X	X	X		n.a.	99%	95-99%
SSI	Resolver	NC	X	X	X		n.a.	99%	95-99%
SSI	SSI	NC	X	X	X		n.a.	99%	90-95%
NC	SIN/COS	NC	X	X		Fault exclusion mech. shaft breakage, positive encoder shaft connection required	90%	99%	90-95%
NC	Resolver	NC	X	X		Fault exclusion mech. shaft breakage, positive encoder shaft connection required	90%	99%	90-95%

<i>Type</i> <i>Encoder to interface</i> <i>X31/32</i>	<i>Type</i> <i>Encoder to interface</i> <i>X31/34</i>	<i>Type</i> <i>Encoder to X 23</i>	<i>Safe speed</i>	<i>Safe direction</i>	<i>Safe position</i>	<i>Fault exclusion</i>	<i>DC</i>		
							1-channel partial system	2-channel partial system dynamic	2-channel partial system non-dynamic (standstill monitoring)
NC	HTL	NC	X			Fault exclusion mech. shaft breakage, positive encoder shaft connection required	60%	99%	80-90%
NC	SSI	2 x Bero 90°	X	X	X		n.a.	99%	90-95%

4.2.2.4 Specific diagnostic measures with regard to the encoder type used

Encoder type		Supply voltage monitoring	Difference level monitoring	SIN/COS plausibility monitoring	Signal level input monitoring	Monitoring of the permissible quadrants	Monitoring of the counting signal separated for track A/B	Monitoring of the transfer ratio reference signal / measured signal	Frequency monitoring of the reference signal	Voltage monitoring of the reference signal	Form factor analysis of the measured signal	Plausibility test position signal versus speed	Monitoring of Clk-frequency
Interface X 31/32, X23	Incremental	X	X				X						
	SIN/COS	X		X									
	SSI	X	X										
	Bero 2 x counting input	X											
	Bero 1 x counting input	X											
Interface X 33/34	Incremental	X	X		X		X						
	HTL		X		X								
	Resolver			X		X		X	X	X	X		
	SIN_COS	X		X		X ¹⁾							
	SSI	X	X									X	X

¹⁾ Only in High-Resolution Mode

4.2.2.5 Safety relevant cut-off thresholds encoder systems for position and speed detection

Plausibility tests with the current position and speed values are performed between both measuring channels A and B of the PSCBR module as a basic measure, which are then checked against parameterizable thresholds.

The **incremental shut-down threshold** describes the tolerable deviation of position between both sensing channels A and B in the unit of the measuring distance.

The **speed shut-down threshold** describes the tolerable deviation in speed between both sensing channels A and B.

Diagnostic functions for the determination of optimal parameter values for the applications are available within the SCOPE-dialog of the parameterization tool.


Note:

Speed and acceleration are detected values with a minimal digital resolution.

This fact limits the smallest possible detection of speed or acceleration and determines the digital step width for the input values.


Speed resolution:

Up to a frequency of 500 Hz or 500 steps/s speed is detected with the frequency measuring method, below this it is measured with a time measuring method. This results in the following course of the sensing fault:




Acceleration resolution order of G. Bauer3 acc. to EN:

The digital acceleration resolution is limited by a maximum peak time of 256 ms and the encoder resolution. The graphs below show the lowest measurable acceleration in dependence on the resolution in revolutions/min, mm/s² and m/s².



Graph acceleration, rotary
(Values in rev/min/s)



Graph acceleration, linear
(Values in mm/s and m/s²)

⚠ Safety note:

- The fault can be optimized by choosing a suitable sensor resolution for the corresponding application.
- For applications with limited resolution and/or time variance of the sensing signal, the functional performance of the monitoring function used can be improved by using an average filter. The average filter "smoothes" digital spurious components of the sensors. However, this is achieved at the cost of a longer response time of the overall system.
- The filter time can be variably set between 0 and 64 in steps of 8. The dimension is "msec". In order to determine the response time of the overall system, the filter times must be added to the specified response times of the PSCBR systems (see chapter 11).

⚠ Safety note:

- The manufacturer's data (MTTF_D, FIT-numbers, etc.) must be used for a safety related assessment of the partial system "Sensors".
- If the manufacturer demands specific diagnoses to be able to guarantee the specified safety related characteristic values, these must be checked with respect to the specific encoder as specified in the table "Specific diagnostic measures for position and speed sensors". If in doubt, the matter must be clarified by the manufacturer.

-
- The DC-values listed in the table must be used conservatively and compliance with the boundary conditions (see table under "Remarks") must be ensured.
 - in order to determine the DC-value for safety functions with standstill monitoring a frequency assessment of the dynamic status may be required. A DC of 90 % may here be used as a guide value.
 - According to the applicable standards, fault exclusions are permitted. The boundary conditions mentioned in this context must permanently be met.
 - If several sensor systems are required for the correct function of a single safety function, their partial values must be correctly merged by following the chosen method. This applies also for a combination of digital and analog sensors (e.g. safely reduced speed with open safety door = door contact + encoder for speed detection)
 - By choosing a suitable resolution of the sensor system a sufficiently low tolerance with regard to the corresponding cut-off thresholds for the individual safety functions must be ensured.
 - When using the encoder input filter one must consider the extension of the response time when assessing the safety related function.

4.2.2.6 Safety related assessment of encoder types or there combination

Due to the monitoring functions implemented in the PSCBR-series, no special demands are initially made on the internal design of the encoder electronics in applications with encoder systems, i.e. standard encoders can normally be used.

A safety related assessment of the overall arrangement must generally be made. Data issued by the encoder manufacturer (FIT, MTTF) as well as the DC from the table in 4.2.2 must in this case be used.

When using individual encoders at least an fault exclusion for the mechanical actuating chain, as well as for the single-channel part of must be made under due consideration of the applicable specification in EN 13849-1. Furthermore, the information in 4.2.2 must also be observed.

PI d and higher acc. to EN 13849-1 is normally reached by a combination of two encoders with prioritized different technology and separated mechanical linking.

The use of compact encoders with internal 2-channel structure of different technology is also suitable for applications up to PI e acc. to EN 13849-1, however, under due consideration of the specifically required fault exclusions and their permissibility. Normally one should use encoders with proven safety related characteristics, the safety level of which meets the demanded level.

Safety note:

- They use of standard encoders or a combination of standard encoders is permitted. For the overall arrangement consisting of encoder, further sensors/switching elements for triggering the safety function, the PSCBR-module and their cut-off channel a safety related assessment is strictly required. For determining the achieved safety level one needs, among others, information from the manufacturer (FIT, MTTF) and the DC as specified under 4.2.2.
- If only one encoder is used, the fault exclusion "shaft breakage / fault in the mechanical encoder connection" is required. Suitable measures must be applied for this purpose, e.g. a positive connection of the encoder by means of slot shim or locking pin. The applicable information issued by the manufacturer as well as EN 138549-1 with respect to requirements and permissibility of the fault exclusion must strictly be followed.
- Encoders with proven safety related characteristics must preferably be used as individual encoders. The safety level of these encoders must at least meet the intended safety level of the overall arrangement. The information of the manufacturer with respect to diagnostic measures, mechanical connection and measures for the voltage supply must be strictly followed.
- SIN/COS encoder: The internal structure of the sensor system must be designed in such a way, that output signals for both tracks can be generated independently from each other and Common-Cause faults can be ruled out. Evidence of the mechanical design, e.g. fastening of the code disc on the shaft, must also be provided. Encoders with proven safety related characteristics should preferably be used.
- When using compact encoders with internal dual-channel structure, such as e.g. SSI + incremental/SinCos, you must strictly follow the instructions of the manufacturer concerning safety related characteristics, diagnostic measures, mechanical connection and measures concerning the electric power supply. The safety level of the encoder must at least meet the intended safety level of the overall arrangement. Encoders with proven safety related characteristics should preferably be used.

The PSCBR module generally detects the following faults in the external encoder system:

- Short-circuits between safety relevant signal lines
- Interruptions in safety relevant signal lines
- Stuck at 0 or 1 on one or all safety relevant signal lines

Each encoder type has further specific diagnoses for fault detection in the external encoder system assigned. The following list shows the respective diagnostic measures for the individual encoders, together with the limiting parameters.


 **Safety note:**

- The diagnostic measures obviously have tolerances because of measuring inaccuracies. These tolerances must be accounted for in the safety related assessment.
- The limiting values for the corresponding diagnostic measures are partly parametrizable or fixed. The diagnostic coverages resulting from this must be assessed in relation to the application and included in the safety related overall assessment.

4.2.3 Analog sensors

The basic modules PSCBR-C-10-SDM2A have two analog inputs with two input channels each. Only 2-channel sensors can generally be connected to this interface.

The internal signal processing takes place separately in the two channels with cross-comparison of the results.



Dual-channel sensor system with separate signal processing in two channels, diagnose by cross-comparison in the PES

As with other sensor systems, a vast number of diagnostic measures has been implemented.

With respect to their type and effectiveness diagnostic measures can generally be classified using the following table:

Diagnoses for sensors for position and/or speed detection:

Measure	DC	Note	Use
Cross-comparison of input signals with dynamic test, if short-circuits cannot be detected (for multiple inputs/outputs)	90	Comparison of the analog input values with identical characteristics for both channels	Monitoring of dual-channel systems with identical characteristic of the input signals
Cross-comparison of input signals with immediate and intermediate results in the logic (L) and temporal as well as logic program sequence monitoring and detection of static failures and short circuits (for multiple inputs/outputs).	99	Comparison of the analog input values with diverse characteristic for both channels. E.g. inverse signal course, etc.	Monitoring of dual-channel systems with diverse characteristic of the input signals


⚠ Safety note:

- The manufacturer's data (MTTF_D, FIT-numbers, etc.) must be used for a safety related assessment of the partial system "Sensors".
- The DC-values listed in the table must be used conservatively and compliance with the boundary conditions (see table under "Remarks") must be ensured.
- According to the applicable standards, fault exclusions are permitted. The boundary conditions mentioned in this context must permanently be met.
- If several sensor systems are required for the correct function of a single safety function, their partial values must be correctly merged by following the chosen method. This applies also for a combination of digital and analog sensors (e.g. safely reduced speed with open safety door = door contact + encoder for speed detection)

4.2.3.1 Exemplary connection of analog sensors

By using suitable sensors and careful wiring of the sensor
PI e acc. to EN ISO 13849 can be achieved.

The analog current inputs are all equipped with the fixed loading resistor of 500Ohm. For analog voltage inputs this resistor is omitted.




⚠ Safety note:

- PI e acc. to EN ISO 13849-1 is achieved when using two non-reactive sensors, for which Common Cause faults can be ruled out.


4.3 Safety related characteristic data and wiring of the outputs

PSCBR modules all have safe outputs of various types. For wiring, the corresponding characteristic as specified in the following description, must be accounted for


4.3.1 Characteristic of the output elements




Single-channel output PSCBR and single-channel actuator without diagnostics




Single-channel output PSCBR and single-channel actuator with diagnostics




Single-channel output PSCBR (Rel 1 / 2 DO 0/1P, DO 0/1M) and dual-channel actuator with at least single-channel diagnostics.




Single-channel output PSCBR with internal dual-channel processing and dual-channel actuator with at least single-channel diagnose



Single-channel output PSCBR with internal dual-channel processing and dual-channel actuator with dual-channel diagnose



Dual-channel output PSCBR and dual-channel actuator with single-channel diagnose



Dual-channel output PSCBR and dual-channel actuator with dual-channel diagnose

4.3.2 Diagnoses in the cut-off circuit

The cut-off circuit is equipped with durably implemented and parametrizable diagnostics functions. Certain diagnostics functions also include the external part of the cut-off channel. Depending on the use of these diagnostics functions, different DC-values will arise.

4.3.2.1 Diagnostic Functions

Durably implemented diagnostics functions:

Cross-wire readback of outputs:

All safety outputs are read back in the complementary channel. Faults in the internal cutout circuit of the PSCBR module are thus detected with DC = High.

Test of cutout ability for Rel 1 and 2 (only control of relay), DO 0P, DO 0M, DO 1P, Do 1M:

The cutout ability of these outputs is cyclically tested. Failure of the cutout possibility is clearly detected.

Parametrizable diagnostics functions:

Readback of the actuator status via auxiliary contacts, position indicators, etc.:

The current status of the actuator is detected by correspondingly suitable auxiliary contacts or position indicators and compared with the nominal status. Any deviation is thereby clearly recognized.

Note: The DC depends on a single-channel or dual-channel diagnose as well as on the switching frequency.

Testing the cutout ability for EAA1..40:

Once this function has been activated, the cutout ability of these outputs is cyclically tested.

Failure of the cutout possibility is clearly detected.

4.3.2.2 Overview DC with respect to the chosen diagnostics functions

Measure	DC	Note	Use
Monitoring of outputs b a channel without dynamic test.	0-90 %	DC depending on switching frequency When using elements for switching amplification external relays or contactors) only effective in connection with the readback function of the switching contacts	Monitoring of electro-mechanical, pneumatic or hydraulic actuators / outputs
Redundant cutout path with monitoring one of the drive elements	90 %	When using elements for switching amplification external relays or contactors) only effective in connection with the readback function of the switching contacts	Monitoring of the outputs with direct functions as safety circuit or monitoring of safety circuits with elements for switching amplification of pneumatic / hydraulic control valves in connection with readback functions from their switching status
Cross-comparison of input signals with immediate and intermediate results in the logic (L) and temporal as well as logic program sequence monitoring and detection of static failures and short circuits (for multiple inputs/outputs).	99 %	When using elements for switching amplification external relays or contactors) only effective in connection with the readback function of the switching contacts For applications with frequent safety shut-down requests these tests should be performed more frequently, e.g. at the beginning of the shift, 1 x per week. However, a test should at least be carried out cyclically 1 x year.	Monitoring of the outputs with direct functions as safety circuit or monitoring of safety circuits with elements for switching amplification of pneumatic / hydraulic control valves in connection with readback functions from their switching status

4.3.3 Basic outputs

The modules

- PSCBR-C-10, PSCBR-C-10-SDM1, PSCBR-C-10-SDM1-1, PSCBR-C-10-SDM2, PSCBR-C-10-SDM2-
- PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO

all have basic outputs of identical design.

The PSCBR module provides a total of 8 outputs, which can be interconnected individually or in groups.

Output	Architecture acc. to EN ISO 13849-1	Comment
K1 and K2	4	Complete tripping channel in compliance with architecture category 4 acc. to EN ISO 13849-1
K1	Not safe	Only functional
K2	Not safe	Only functional
DO0_P and DO0_M	4	Complete tripping channel in compliance with architecture category 4 acc. to EN ISO 13849-1
DO0_P	Not safe	Only functional
DO0_M	Not safe	Only functional
DO1_P and DO1_M	4	Complete tripping channel in compliance with architecture category 4 acc. to EN ISO 13849-1
DO1_P	Not safe	Only functional
DO1_M	Not safe	Only functional
O.1	Not safe	Signalling/auxiliary output
O.2	Not safe	Signalling/auxiliary output

The HISIDE and LOWSIDE outputs are subjected to a plausibility test in all operating states. In switched on state the correct function of all outputs is tested with a cyclic test pulse. For this purpose the output is switched to the corresponding inverse value for a test period $TT < 300\mu s$, i.e. one P-output is switched instantaneously to 0 VDC potential, while one M-output is switched to 24 VDC potential.

The relay outputs are monitored for plausibility during each switching cycle. The relay outputs must be switched cyclically and thus tested to maintain the safety function. The switching/test cycle is determined in dependence on the application.

 **Safety note:**

- For applications with frequent safety shut-down requests these tests should be performed more frequently, e.g. at the beginning of the shift, 1 x per week. However, a test should at least be carried out cyclically 1 x year.
- The test function for the outputs is performed for groups and individual controls. The auxiliary outputs are not tested.
- The High-Side (DO.0_P, DO.1_P) and Low-Side (DO.0_M, DO.1_M) outputs must individually not be used for safety duties. Any use for safety duties is only permitted for High-Side / Low-Side combination

The outputs can be loaded as follows:

Output	Voltage	Current
K1, K2	24 VDC	2.0 A
K1, K2	230VAC	2.0 A
O.1, O.2	24 VDC	100 mA
DO.0_P, DO.1_P	24 VDC	250 mA
DO.0_M, DO.1_M	GNDEXT	250 mA

 **Safety note:**

- For safety relevant applications only external switching elements with a minimum withstand current of > 1.2 mA may be used.
- For the output system a vast number of diagnostic measures have been implemented. Special attention must be paid to the inclusion of elements for switching amplification, such as relays, contactors, etc. in the cutout circuit.
- When used in elevator technology acc. to EN81, the outputs of the internal relays must not be used for switching voltages higher than 24V, because this would contradict the specifications of EN81. Non-compliance will lead to the loss of all warranty claims and Schmersal will not be liable for compensation.

4.3.3.1 Wiring examples basic outputs

4.3.3.1.1 Single-pole switching relay or semi-conductor output without test

For the connection of multi-phase applications or for higher current demands external contactors may be used. For a single-pole connection without external test please bear in mind that the PSCBR1X module will not recognize bonding of one or several external contacts. The following circuit example is only limited suitable for safety applications, PI b acc. to EN 13849-1 can maximally be achieved!




Fig.: Single-pole switching P-output.




Fig.: Single-pole switching relay output.

Safety note:

- Not recommended for safety applications! In this context see also the notes in EN 13849-1 concerning the application and the required fault exclusions.

4.3.3.1.2 Single-pole switching relay or semi-conductor output with external switching amplifier and testing

When using external switching amplifiers or downstream electro-mechanical, pneumatic or hydraulic components, the setup for testing the complete chain and a message/warning feature for detected faults is required in order to achieve PI c or higher.

Positively guided auxiliary contacts are especially needed for electro-mechanical devices and message contacts for the valve position are required for hydraulic or pneumatic components. The message/warning device must ensure that the operator recognizes the dangerous situation immediately.

The achievable PI is mainly depending on the test rate, PI d acc. to EM 13849-1 can maximally be achieved.




Fig.: Single-pole relay output with testing

⚠ Safety note:

- Only conditionally recommended for safety applications! In this context see also the notes in EN 13849-1 concerning the application and the required fault exclusions.
- For PI c or higher a test rate of $> 100 \cdot$ the request rate is required.
- For PL c and higher a message/warning feature is required, which informs the operator immediately about a dangerous situation

4.3.3.1.3 Single-pole switching relay or semi-conductor output with dual-channel external circuit with testing

For safety applications from PI c and higher acc. to EN ISO 13849-1 we strongly recommend or even demand the control of two external cutout elements. Furthermore, the setup for testing the complete chain and a message/warning device for an detected fault is required for achieving PI c or higher - see also remarks under 4.3.3.1.2.




Fig.: Single-channel switching output DO0_P with dual-channel external circuit and monitoring at output 1 as group feedback

The two external monitoring contacts are switched in series, supplied by the clock signal P1 and read via input 1. Input 1 was chosen as readback input, but any other input can be assigned for this purpose.




Fig.: Single-channel switching output DO0_P with dual-channel external circuit as combination of electro-mechanical element and hydraulic/pneumatic valve and monitoring at two inputs

⚠ Safety note:

- Only conditionally recommended for safety applications! In this context see also the notes in EN 13849-1 concerning the application and the required fault exclusions.
- For PL c and higher a message/warning feature is required, which informs the operator immediately about a dangerous situation
- For higher requirements you must make sure that at least 1 switching operation must take place every 24 hours, in order to test the switching ability of the external power contactor.

4.3.3.1.4 Two-channel switching relay output with external monitoring - group feedback

For safety related applications from PI d acc. to EN ISO 13849-1 two relays on the PSCBR1X module and two external power contactors are used.




Fig.: Two-channel switching relay output with external monitoring – group feedback


The two external monitoring contacts are switched in series, supplied by the clock signal P1 and read in from DI1 (configured as EMU-input). In case of higher demands one must consider that at least 1 switching process must take place every 24 hours.

⚠ Safety note:

- For achieving PI e acc. to EN ISO 13849-1 a sufficiently high testing rate is required.
- For applications with frequent safety shut-down requests these tests should be performed more frequently, e.g. at the beginning of the shift, 1 x per week. However, a test should at least be carried out cyclically 1 x year.


4.3.3.1.5 Dual-channel output with relay output and semi-conductor output – external control circuit with monitoring

For safety applications from PI d and higher acc. to EN ISO 13849-1. The external circuit is controlled in dual-channel mode via a relay and a semi-conductor output. Each of the two external cutout paths is monitored. For PL e acc. to EN ISO 13849-1 a sufficiently high testing rate and $MTTF_D = \text{high}$ is demanded for the external circuit.




4.3.3.1.6 Dual-channel output with relay output and external control circuit in PI e

For safety applications from PI d and higher acc. to EN ISO 13849-1. The external circuit is controlled in dual-channel mode via the relay outputs. For PL e acc. to EN ISO 13849-1 a sufficiently high testing rate and PI e is demanded for the external circuit.



4.3.3.1.7 Dual-channel output with semi-conductor output and external control circuit in PI e

For safety applications from PI d and higher acc. to EN ISO 13849-1. The external circuit is controlled in dual-channel mode via the semi-conductor outputs. For PL e acc. to EN ISO 13849-1 PI e is demanded for the external circuit



4.3.3.1.8 Wiring of an auxiliary output

Both semi-conductor outputs implemented on the PSCBR1X module can be wired for functional applications. These outputs are not pulse-commutated.




Fig.: Wiring of an auxiliary output

Applications with auxiliary outputs are not accepted for safety related applications!

4.3.4 Configurable I/O as outputs

The extension module PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO has 10 configurable safe I/O EAA1...EAA10 (see chapter 3 Module overview). Parameterized as an output this connection acts as a safe digital Hi-Side output (DO_P).

4.3.4.1 Classification of the I/O when used as output


Architecture	Performance Level	Comment
Static single-channel	PL c	- Fault detection or fault reaction acc. to cat. 2
Static two-channel	PL e	- Different group
Static two-channel	PL d	Same group: - Time-shifted triggering on PLC level - Fault approach short-circuit on both outputs Different group: - Nom further requirements necessary
Dynamically single-channel	PL e	Nom further requirements necessary
Dynamically dual-channel	PL e	Nom further requirements necessary

Note:

- 1) Group 1: EAA1 ... EAA6
Group 2: EAA7 ... EAA10
- 2) Static: no pulse test on output
Dynamic: Pulse test on output with $t_{Test} \leq 500 \mu s$

4.3.4.2 Wiring example for outputs of extension module

4.3.4.2.1 Wiring single-channel without testing



⚠ Safety note:

- Not recommended for safety applications! In this context see also the notes in EN 13849-1 concerning the application and the required fault exclusions.

4.3.4.2.2 Wiring single-channel with testing

Use of one output EAA1...40 in connection with a single-channel external wiring for testing. Positively guided auxiliary contacts are especially needed for electro-mechanical devices and message contacts for the valve position are required for hydraulic or pneumatic components. Furthermore, a message/warning device for indicating a failure is required. The message/warning device must ensure that the operator recognizes the dangerous situation immediately. The achievable PI is mainly depending on the test rate, PI d acc. to EM 13849-1 can maximally be achieved.




Fig.: Single-pole relay output with testing

⚠ Safety note:

- Only conditionally recommended for safety applications! In this context see also the notes in EN 13849-1 concerning the application and the required fault exclusions.
- For PI c or higher a test rate of $> 100 \cdot$ the request rate is required.
- For PL c and higher a message/warning feature is required, which informs the operator immediately about a dangerous situation

4.3.4.2.3 Single-channel output in connection with a safe shut-down circuit

For safety applications from PI c and higher acc. to EN ISO 13849-1. The external circuit is controlled directly via an output. The achievable PL acc. to EN ISO 13849-1 depends on the use of dynamic testing (see 4.3.2.1 DC) and the PL of the downstream device.




Fig.: Single-pole semi-conductor output in connection with device with tested shut-down.

4.3.4.2.4 Single-channel output in connection with a dual-channel shut-down circuit

Suitable for PI d and higher acc. to EN ISO 13849-1. Use of one output EAA1...40 in connection with a dual-channel external wiring with testing. Positively guided auxiliary contacts are especially needed for electro-mechanical devices and message contacts for the valve position are required for hydraulic or pneumatic components.

The achievable PI depends on the use of dynamic testing as well as $MTTF_D$ -value of the external channel. PI e acc. to EN ISO 13849-1 can maximally be reached.





Fig.: Single-pole semi-conductor output in connection with dual-channel shut-down circuit with testing.


4.3.4.2.5 Dual-channel output

Suitable for PI d and higher acc. to EN ISO 13849-1. Use of two outputs EAA1...40 in connection with a dual-channel external wiring.

4.3.4.2.6 Wiring dual-channel in same group



4.3.4.2.7 Wiring dual-channel in different group



 **Safety note:**

- For a safety related assessment of the partial system output the data issued by the respective manufacturer (MTTF_D, FIT-numbers, B10d-value, etc.) must be used when using external elements, e.g. for switching amplification, in the shut-down circuit.
- The DC-values listed in the table must be used conservatively and compliance with the boundary conditions (see table under "Remarks") must be ensured.
- According to the applicable standards, fault exclusions are permitted. The boundary conditions mentioned in this context must permanently be met.
- When using elements for switching amplification in safety circuits, their function must be monitored by means of suitable readback contacts, etc. (see circuitry examples). Suitable readback contacts are contacts which are linked with the contacts in the shut-down circuit in a positively switching way.
- The switching ability of the external switching amplifier must be cyclically tested. The time between 2 tests must be determined in accordance with the requirements of the application and ensured by suitable measures. Suitable measures may be of organizational (On and Off switching at the beginning of a shift, etc.) or technical (automatic, cyclic switching) nature.

4.3.4.3 Overview of achievable PI for digital safety outputs

Output PSCBR	Actuator / external shut-down circuit	Category acc. to EN13849-1	DC		MTTF _D Actuator or	Achievable PI acc. to EN ISO 13849-1	Boundary conditions	Fault exclusion
Single-channel without dynamic output test Rel 1 or 2 DO 0P, DO 0M, DO 1P, DO 1M EAA1..EAA40	Single-channel Contactor, valve, brake, etc. without direct feedback for diagnostics.	Cat. B	0 %		Medium	b	Contactor and downstream actuators appropriately designed for safety application	
	High	c	As before					
						d	As before DC = 90 % due to a sufficiently high test rate with reference to the application	
Single-channel without dynamic output test Rel 1 or 2 or Single-channel DO 0P, DO 0M, DO 1P, DO 1M	Dual channel Contactor, valve, brake, etc. with direct feedback for diagnostics at least in one channel or actuator single-channel controlled with safety function cat. 3 (e.g. STO)	Cat. 2	90 %	Monitoring only in an external shut-down circuit	Medium	c	Message output required for warning in case of detected malfunction Contactor and downstream actuators appropriately designed for safety application	Short circuit on external control
					High	d		
Single-channel without dynamic output test EAA1..EAA40	Dual channel Contactor, valve, brake, etc. with direct feedback for diagnostics at least in one channel or actuator single-channel controlled with safety function cat. 3 (e.g. STO)	Cat. 3	90 %	Monitoring only in an external shut-down circuit	Medium or High	d	Contactor and downstream actuators appropriately designed for safety application	Short circuit on external control
Single-channel with dynamic output test EAA1..EAA40	Dual channel Contactor, valve, brake, etc. with direct feedback for diagnostics at least in one channel or actuator with safety function cat. 4 (e.g. STO)	Cat. 4	99 %	Monitoring in both external shut-down circuits	High	e	Contactor and downstream actuators appropriately designed for safety application Monitoring of electro-mechanical components by means of positively guided switches, position monitoring of control valves, etc.	

Output PSCBR	Actuator / external shut-down circuit	Category acc. to EN13849-1	DC		MTTF _D Actuator or	Achievable PI acc. to EN 13849-1	Boundary conditions	Fault exclusion
Dual-channel without dynamic output test Rel 1 and Rel 2 2 x EAA1..EAA40	Dual-channel Contactor, valve, brake, etc. with direct feedback for diagnostics at least in one channel or actuator with safety function cat. 4 (e.g. STO)	Cat. 3	90 %	Monitoring in both external shut-down circuits	Medium or High	d	<p>Contactor and downstream actuators appropriately designed for safety application</p> <p>Monitoring of electro-mechanical components by means of positively guided switches, position monitoring of control valves, etc.</p> <p>Outputs EAA1..40, 1 x each from different groups (groups of 6/4 contiguous EAA-ports each, e.g. EAA1..6,EAA7..10)</p> <p>or</p> <p>Time-shifted triggering on PLC level</p>	Short circuit on external control
Dual-channel Rel 1 and Rel 2 or Dual-channel with dynamic output test DO 0P and, DO 0M, DO 1P and DO 1M 2 x EAA1..EAA40	Dual-channel Contactor, valve, brake, etc. with direct feedback for diagnostics at least in one channel or actuator with safety function cat. 4 (e.g. STO)	Cat. 4	99%	Monitoring in both external shut-down circuits	High	e	<p>Contactor and downstream actuators appropriately designed for safety application</p> <p>Monitoring of electro-mechanical components by means of positively guided switches, position monitoring of control valves, etc.</p> <p>For applications with frequent safety shut-down requests these tests should be performed more frequently, e.g. at the beginning of the shift, 1 x per week. However, a test should at least be carried out cyclically 1 x year.</p>	Short-circuit in external control in both channels

5 Connection and installation

5.1 General notes on installation

Strictly follow the safety regulations when installing!

Degree of protection IP52

Route all signal lines for the interfacing of digital inputs and contact monitoring separately. You should in any case disconnect 230VAC voltages from low voltage power lines, if these voltages are used in connection with the application.

The cable lengths for digital inputs and outputs must normally not exceed **30 m**. If the cable lengths exceeds 30 m you must apply appropriate measures for fault exclusion concerning impermissible overvoltage. Appropriate measures include e.g. lightning protection for outdoor lines, overvoltage protection of the indoor system, protected routing of cables.

Measures concerning the electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)

The PSCBR module is intended for use in the drive environment and meets the EMC-requirements mentioned above.

It is also assumed that the electromagnetic compatibility of the overall system is ensured by application of appropriate measures.

Use of the module as PESSRAL acc. to EN81:

When using the module as PESSRAL acc. to EN81 (elevator standard), the device must be installed at a minimum distance of 200mm to the transmitting facility with the following frequency ranges (mobile radio, etc.) 166-1000 MHz, 1710-1784 MHz, 1880-1960 MHz. The field strength of the transmitting facility must not exceed the following field strength values:

30V/m at 166-1000 and 1710-1784 MHz, 10V/m at 1880-1960 MHz .

Installation in a closed housing with degree of protection IP5X or better is additionally required.

Safety note:

- Electric power supply lines of the PSCBR and "discontinuous-action lines" of the power converter must be isolated from each other.
- Signal lines and power lines of the power converter must be routed through separate cable ducts. The distance between the cable ducts should be minimum 10 mm.
- Only shielded cables must be used to connect the position and speed sensors. The signal transmission cable must be RS-485-standard compliant (lines twisted in pairs).
- Care must be taken to ensure that the shielding is correctly connected in the 9-pin SUB-D plugs of the position and speed sensors. Only metal or metal coated plugs are permitted.
- The shielding on the sensor side must comply with appropriate methods.
- EMC-compliant installation of the power converter technology in the environment of the PSCBR module must be assured. Special attention must be paid to the routing of cables, the shielding of motor cables and the connection of the braking resistor. Strict compliance with the installation instructions of the power converter manufacturer is mandatory.

-
- All contactors in the environment of the power converter must be equipped with appropriate suppressor circuits.
 - Suitable measures to protect against overvoltages must be applied.

Additional safety regulations when using as PESSRAL acc. to EN81

- Install the device at a distance of at least 200 mm from the HF-transmitting facility (WLAN, GSM, etc.). The transmitting facilities must thereby not exceed the max. field strengths as specified above.
- The device must be installed in a closed housing, IP5X or better.

5.2 Installation and assembly of the PSCBR module

The module is solely to be installed in control cabinets with a degree of protection of at least IP54.

The modules must be vertically fastened on a top hat rail

The ventilation slots must be kept unobstructed, to ensure adequate air circulation inside the module.

5.3 Installation of backplane bus system

Mounting several PSCBR modules (PSCBR-C-10, PSCBR-C-10-SDM1, PSCBR-C-10-SDM2, PSCBR-C-10-SDM2A) on one top hat rail in connection with the backplane bus system is also possible. These modules can be combined with a communication extension. In this case the backplane bus system needs to be configured by Schmersal when placing the order and delivered in accordance with the application in question.

The backplane bus system consists of a 5-pin plug connector with snap-in contacts. In these plug connectors all 5 contacts are equipped by standard. In this case the component is not specially marked. On a second variant of the plug connector only 3 contacts are equipped.

Note:

Expansion modules have no own power supply unit and depend on a DC power supply via the backplane bus system. Base modules (PSCBR-C-10, PSCBR-C-10-SDM1, PSCBR-C-10-SDM2, PSCBR-C-10-SDM2A) are equipped with a reinforced power supply unit and always feed in to the backplane bus.

There are two different types of backplane bus connectors:

- **TB1:** Standard design (all contacts are present)
- **TB2:** Circuit breaker design (The two live conductors are not present and are marked with a green dot.)

Using the backplane bus connector TB1:


The backplane bus connector TB1 can only be installed in connection with expansion modules without their own power supply. Connection of several standalone modules is not possible.

Using the backplane bus connector TB2:

The backplane bus connector TB2 is used for combining several base modules with expansion modules. A detailed description can be found under point 4.3.1.


5.3.1 Arrangement examples

5.3.1.1 PSCBR-C-10-SDM1 + PSCBR-C-10-SDM1 + PSCBR-C-10-SDM1 + PSCBR-F



There is no TB2 between the last PSCBR-C-10-SDM1 module and the communication module PSCBR-F, because the power supply for the PSCBR-F is fed in through the backplane bus system.

5.3.1.2 PSCBR-C-10-SDM2 + PSCBR-C-10-SDM1 + PSCBR-F




There is no TB2 between the last PSCBR-C-10-SDM1 module and the communication module PSCBR5, because the power supply for the PSCBR5 is fed in through the backplane bus system.

5.4 Assembling the modules

The modules are mounted on C-standard rails by means of snap-on latches.

5.4.1 Assembly on C-rail

The devices are inserted into the rail under an oblique angle and then snapped on downwards. For disassembling use a screwdriver, insert it into the slot of the downwards pointing latch and then move it up.



5.4.2 Assembly on backplane bus

After assembling the backplane bus the device can be installed. For this purpose insert the module from above into the plug connection under a oblique angle and snap it onto the C-rail.



Insert the module from above under an oblique angle.



Snap-on downwards on to the C-rail.

The backplane plug connection can later be extended. The system configuration can thus be extended by additional modules.




Snap the backplane bus element into the C-rail and insert it into the counter-piece by sliding it sideways.

5.5 Installation and configuration I/O-extension PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO

5.5.1 Log on PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO to basic group

After starting the "Safe PLC" program you must first choose the basic unit, followed by the extension PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO.




Note:

Max. two PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO modules can be operated with one basic unit.

5.5.2 Physical address configuration PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO

On the PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO module the bus address must be set with the help of the address switch.

This setting is made on the back of the module




Note:

- Address range of the PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO module from 1...15.
- Address "0" is reserved for the basic device.

5.5.3 Configuration of the I/O-assignment PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO

In the main menu of the "Safe PLC" program one can open the configuration dialog for the PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO module by "double-clicking" on the basic device.




5.5.4 Logic address configuration PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO

The following settings must be made in the PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO configuration dialogue:


- Logic address PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO device x: Setting the address switch of the PSCBR module x

- Group1 EAAx.1-EAAx.6 or group1 EAAx.7-EAAx.10: When using these outputs one can choose between safety and standard outputs.




5.6 Terminal assignment


5.6.1 Terminal assignment PSCBR-C-10



5.6.2 Terminal assignment PSCBR-C-10-SDM1



5.6.3 Terminal assignment PSCBR-C-10-SDM2




Axis 1

Axis 1

Axis 2

Axis 2

HTL encoder connection: A+,B+




HTL encoder connection: A+,A-



Printed circuit board

CPU board

5.6.4 Terminal assignment PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO



5.7 External 24 VDC – power supply

The PSCBR module requires a 24 VDC power supply with PELV characteristic in accordance to EN50178. Please comply with the following boundary conditions when planning and installing the specified power supply unit:

Strictly comply with the minimum and maximum supply voltage tolerance.

Nominal voltage	DC 24 V
Minimum: 24 VDC – 15 %	20.4 VDC
Maximum: 24 VDC + 20 %	28.8 VDC

We recommend the use of a 3-phase power supply unit or an electronically controlled device to achieve an as little as possible residual ripple of the supply voltage. The power supply unit must meet the requirements acc. to EN61000-4-11 (voltage dip).

Connecting cables must comply with local regulations.

The interference voltage resistance of the PSCBR module is 32 VDC (protected by suppressor diodes at the input).

 **Safety note:**

- The PSCBR module must be individually protected by a 2A/24VDC back-up fuse. single-pole thermal magnetic circuit breaker with rapid acting characteristic
- The power supply has to measure up with PELV standard in accordance to EN50178

Comments:

Reliable galvanic isolation from the 230 VAC or 400 VAC network must be guaranteed in any case. This requires the selection of power supply units complying with the regulations DIN VDE 0551, EN 60 742 and DIN VDE 0160. Besides choosing a suitable device you must also ensure equipotent bonding between PE and 0-VDC on the secondary side.

IMPORTANT:

Signal GND of all external devices connected to the input interfaces of the PSCBR is to be ensured as equipotent to PSCBR Supply GND.

Input interfaces are:


- Digital inputs
- Encoder inputs
- Analog inputs

Remark:

Input lines GND_ENC and AIN – are not connected internally to supply GND

5.8 Connection of the external encoder supply

5.8.1 Incremental, HTL, SIN/COS, SSI



- 1) Only PSCBR-C-10-SDM1-2 and PSCBR-C-10-SDM2-2
- 2) Only PSCBR-C-10-SDM2 and PSCBR-C-10-SDM2-2
- 3) Only PSCBR-C-10-SDM2-2


The PSCBR module supports encoder voltages of 5V, 8V, 10 V, 12V and 24V, which are internally monitored in accordance with the chosen configuration. If an encoder system is not supplied through the PSCBR module, a supply voltage still needs to be connected to terminal X13 or X15 and configured accordingly. The encoder supply must be protected with a fuse of max. 2A.

Important: Signal GND of the encoder must be equipotent to PSCBR supply GND

Monitoring of the supply voltage in accordance with the chosen nominal voltage:

Nominal voltage	Minimum voltage	Maximum voltage
5 VDC	4.4 VDC	5.6 VDC
8 VDC	7 VDC	9 VDC
10 VDC	8 VDC	12 VDC
12 VDC	10 VDC	14 VDC
24 VDC	20 VDC	29 VDC

5.8.2 Resolver



- 1) Only PSCBR-C-10-SDM1-2 and PSCBR-C-10-SDM2-2
- 2) Only PSCBR-C-10-SDM2-2

When using resolvers in Master-Mode an additional 24V DC power supply is required for generating the reference signal.

The encoder supply must be protected with a fuse of max. 2A.

Supply voltage monitoring:

Nominal voltage	Minimum voltage	Maximum voltage
24 VDC	20 VDC	29 VDC

5.9 Connection of digital inputs

The PSCBR comes with 14 (PSCBR-C-10/11/12) or 12 (PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO) safe digital inputs. These are suitable for connecting single or two-channel signals with and without cycling, or without cross-shortening test.

The connected signals must have a "High"-level of DC 24 V (DC +15 V...+ DC 30 V) and a "Low"-level of (DC -3 V...DC +5 V, type 1 acc. to EN61131-2). 24 VDC; +5 V, Type1 acc. to EN61131-2 The inputs are provided with internal input filters.

A device internal diagnostic function cyclically tests the correct function of the inputs including the input filters. A detected fault will set the PSCBR into an alarm status. At the same time all outputs of the PSCBR are rendered passive.

Besides the actual signal inputs, the PSCBR module holds two clock inputs P1 and P2 available. The clock outputs are switching-type 24 VDC outputs. The clock outputs are solely intended for monitoring the digital inputs (DI1 ... DI14) and cannot be used for any other function within the application.

The switching frequency is 125 Hz for each output. In the planning stage one must bear in mind that the outputs may only be loaded with a total current of max. 250 mA.

Furthermore, approved OSSD-outputs can be connected to the inputs DI1-DI4 and DI9-DI14 without limitation

Note:

Digital inputs DI5 to DI8 are not suitable for OSSDs, because there is no compliance with EN 61131-2 Type 2 requirements.

In case of single-channel use of the inputs, the achievable safety level must be limited to SIL 2 or PL d, if the safety function is demanded at regular intervals.

A safety related use of the inputs is generally only intended in connection with the pulse outputs.

If pulse outputs are not used, short circuits in the external wiring between different inputs and against the supply voltage for the PSCBR must be ruled out by external measures, appropriate routing of cables in particular.

Each input of the PSCBR module can be configured individually for the following signal sources:

Input assigned to pulse P1
Input assigned to pulse P2
Input assigned to continuous voltage DC 24 V

5.10 Connection of analog inputs

The version PSCBR-C-10-SDM2 with analog processing is able to reliably process max. 2 analog signals.

The analog inputs can be connected as follows:

	<i>min</i>	<i>max</i>
Voltage	-7VDC	+10VDC

Note:

The module is equipped with the fixed loading resistor of 500 Ohm as standard. This resistor can be omitted is required (voltage input).

Important: Signal AIN - must be equipotent to PSCBR supply GND

5.11 Connection of position and speed sensors

5.11.1 General notes

Depending on module type the PSCBR module (PSCBR-C-10-SDM1/PSCBR-C-10-SDM2) has (1/2) external encoder interfaces for the connection of industrial incremental and absolute encoders. The encoder interfaces can be configured as incremental, SIN/COS, or as absolute SSI-encoders.

It is also possible to connect 2 incremental signal generating sensors (e.g. proximity switches) to the counting inputs of the PSCBR module. The signals must each be read in with normal and complementary track.

IMPORTANT

The voltage supply of the encoder system uses the dedicated terminals on the PSCBR module. This voltage is applied to the encoder plug and monitored by an internal diagnostic process. When the sensor is supplied with an external voltage, this voltage must be supplied through the encoder plug. The corresponding terminal (encoder supply voltage) on the PSCBR module remains unoccupied.

If an external sensor voltage supply is not recirculated through the encoder plug, any failure of this supply must be included in the fault examination of the overall system. This, in particular, requires evidence that this fault is detected or can be excluded when the specified operating voltage of the overall system is fallen short of / exceeded.

EMC - measures such as shielding etc. must be observed.

The two encoders must be non-interacting to each other. This applies for both the electrical as well as the mechanical part.

If both encoders are coupled to the facility to be monitored via common mechanical parts, the connection must be positively designed and should not have any parts that are susceptible to wear (chains, toothed belts, etc.). Should this be the case, additional monitoring features for the mechanical connection of the sensors (e.g. monitoring of a toothed belt) are required).

In case of an active position processing at least one absolute value encoder must be used.

When using two equivalent sensors one must make sure that the sensor with the higher resolution is configured as sensor 1 (process sensor) and the sensor with the lower resolution as sensor 2 (reference sensor).

Important: Signal GND of the encoder must be equipotent to PSCBR supply GND. This applies although on Resolver-type encoders.

Attention:

The sensor connections must neither be plugged on nor pulled off during operation. This could cause damage to electrical components of the encoder. Always de-energize connected encoders and the PSCBR module **before** plugging on or pulling off encoder connections.

Lines twisted in pairs for signal transmission acc. to RS485 standard must be used for data and clock signals or track A and track B. The wire cross-section must in each individual case be chosen in compliance with the current consumption of the encoder and the cable length required for the installation.

The following applies when using absolute encoders:

In Slave-mode the clock signal is generated by an external process and is read in by the PSCBR module together with the data signal. This type of reading causes a beat which results in a reading fault of the following magnitude:

$$F = (\text{reading time of encoder by external system [ms]} / 8 \text{ [ms]}) * 100 \%$$


The size of the resulting reading fault F must be taken into account when determining the thresholds in the applied monitoring functions, because this fault cannot be compensated!

5.11.2 Assignment of encoder interface


X31/X32¹⁾

Sensor assignment


Incremental - Encoder




SIN/COS



Absolute encoder



SSI - Listener




¹⁾only PSCBR-C-10-SDM2


X33/X34²⁾

Sensor assignment


Incremental - Encoder




SIN/COS




**SSI - Absolute
X 31/X 32**



**SSI - Absolute
X 33/X 34**




Resolver



²⁾only PSCBR-C-10-SDM2-2


5.11.3 Connection variants

5.11.3.1 Connection of an absolute encoder as master




With this type of connection the clock signals are submitted from the PSCBR module to the absolute encoder and the data from the encoder to the PSCBR.

5.11.3.2 Connection of an absolute encoder as slave




With this type of connection both clock signals and data are read in. In this example the module does not supply the encoder with voltage.

5.11.3.3 Connecting an incremental encoder with TTL-signal level




Pins 1, 3 and 7 stay open and are reserved for later expansions.

5.11.3.4 Connection of a SIN/COS encoder




Pins 1, 3 and 7 stay open and are reserved for later expansions.

5.11.3.5 Connection of a resolver as master



With this type of connection the clock signals are submitted from the PSCBR module to the absolute encoder and the data from the encoder to the PSCBR.


5.11.3.6 Connection of a resolver as slave



5.11.3.7 Connection of proximity switch PSCBR-C-10-SDM1/2

The connection is made via plug connector X23 on the digital inputs DI5 ... DI8. The exact pin assignment depends on the encoder type and is shown in the connecting plan of the programming interface.

Note: When using HTL-encoders please bear in mind that the tracks A+ and B+ or A- and B- must be combined accordingly.



5.12 Configuration of measuring distances

5.12.1 General description of encoder configuration

The most important input variables for the monitoring functions of the module are safe position, speed and acceleration. These are obtained by dual-channel generation from the connected sensor system. A category 4 compliant architecture, i.e. continuous dual-channel recording with high degree of diagnostic coverage, is required for PI e acc. to EN 13849-1. For possible single-channel components (e.g. mechanical connection of the sensors/encoders with only one shaft/fastening) fault exclusions acc. to EN ISO 13849-2 may be used, if this should be necessary. For PI d acc. to EN 13849-1 one may work with a reduced degree or diagnostic coverage. Simple design sensor systems (speed monitoring only) may under certain circumstances be sufficient under due consideration of the permissible fault exclusions acc. to EN ISO 13849-2.

See also APPENDIX 1

Further configuration is described in the programming manual:

37350-820-01-xxF-PSCBR Programierhandbuch.pdf

5.12.2 Sensor type

Absolute encoder and incremental measuring systems are possible, as well as counting pulse generating proximity switches

5.12.2.1 Absolute encoder:

Data interface: Serial Synchronous Interface (SSI) with variable data length from 12 to 28 bit.

Data format: Binary or Gray code,

Physical Layer: RS-422 compatible

SSI-Master operation:

Clock rate: 150kHz

SSI-Listener operation (slave mode):

Max. external clock rate 200 KHz ¹⁾ or 350 kHz ²⁾.


Min. clock pause time 30 µsec

Max. clock pause time 1 msec

Diagnoses:


Diagnose	Parameters	Fault threshold
Supply voltage monitoring	Fixed values 5 V, 8V, 10V, 12V, 20V, 24V	+/- 20 % +/-2 %(measuring tolerance)
Monitoring of differential level on input	Fixed value RS 485-level	+/- 20 % +/-2 %(measuring tolerance)
Monitoring of Clk-frequency	Fixed value	100 kHz < f < 350 kHz
Plausibility of speed versus position	Fixed value	DP < 2 * V * T with T = 8 ms

Parameterization of SSI-format:



Example:

SSI-Frame length: 28 cycles
 Data length: 22 bit
 Status: 5 bit, 3 bit Fault + 2 bit Warning/ready for operation



5.12.2.2 Incremental encoder:

Physical Layer: RS-422 compatible
 Measuring signal A/B. Track with 90 degree phase difference
 maximum frequency of input cycles 200 KHz ¹⁾ or 500 kHz ²⁾

Diagnoses:

Diagnose	Parameters	Fault threshold
Supply voltage monitoring	Fixed values 5 V, 8V, 10V, 12V, 20V, 24V	+/- 20 % +/-2 %(measuring tolerance)
Monitoring of differential level on input	Fixed value RS 485-level	+/- 20 % +/-2 %(measuring tolerance)
Monitoring of the counting signal separated for each track A/B	Fixed value	DP > 4 increments

5.12.2.3 SinusCosinus encoder – standard mode

Physical Layer: +/- 0.5 V_{SS} (without voltage offset)
 Measuring signal A/B. Track with 90 degree phase difference
 Maximum frequency of input clock pulses. 200 KHz ¹⁾ or 500 kHz ²⁾

Diagnoses:

Diagnose	Parameters	Fault threshold
Supply voltage monitoring	Fixed values 5 V, 8V, 10V, 12V, 20V, 24V	+/- 20 % +/-2 %(measuring tolerance)
Monitoring of amplitude SIN ² +COS ²	Fixed value 1V _{SS}	65 % of 1 V _{SS} +/- 2.5 %(measuring tolerance)
Monitoring of phases A/B	Fixed value 90°	+/- 30° +/-5° measuring tolerance)

5.12.2.4 SinusCosinus encoder – high resolution mode:

Physical Layer: +/- 0.5 V_{SS} (without voltage offset)
 Measuring signal A/B. Track with 90 degree phase difference
 Maximum frequency of input clock pulses. 15 kHz ²⁾

Diagnoses:

Diagnose	Parameters	Fault threshold
Supply voltage monitoring	Fixed values 5 V, 8V, 10V, 12V, 20V, 24V	+/- 20 % +/-2 %(measuring tolerance)
Monitoring of amplitude SIN ² +COS ²	Fixed value 1V _{SS}	65 % of 1 V _{SS} +/- 2.5 %(measuring tolerance)
Monitoring of phases A/B	Fixed value 90°	+/- 30° +/-5° measuring tolerance)
Monitoring of counting signal / signal phase quadrant	Fixed value	+/- 45°

5.12.2.5 Proximity switch

Signal level. 24V/0V

Max. counting frequency. 10kHz

Circuit logic de-bounced

Diagnoses:

Diagnose	Parameters	Fault threshold
Supply voltage monitoring	Fixed values 5 V, 8V, 10V, 12V, 20V, 24V	+/- 20 % +/-2 %(measuring tolerance)


5.12.2.6 Extended monitoring proximity switch / proximity switch

The extended monitoring uncovers the following faults:


- a) Supply voltage failure
- b) Failure of output signal in driver direction
- c) Malfunction of High signal proximity switch
- d) Interruption of signal path
- e) Mechanical de-adjustment of proximity switch / excessive switching distance of proximity switch

For diagnostic purposes both status conditions of the counting signal are additionally recorded synchronously and compared logically. Attenuation of at least one of the two signals must be ensured by means of a switching gate. The logic will evaluate this instruction.

Design of switching gate with radial sensor arrangement



Intended theoretic signal form



The diagnose must be designed for at least the following limiting values:

- Max. counting frequency: 4 kHz
- Max. blanking 0-signal: 50 %
- Min. coverage 10 %

Reading in counting signals:

The two counting signals are both separately assigned to the two channels. In each of the channels the status is read in synchronously. In order to ensure synchronization this must be carried out directly after the channel synchronization. Sampling must take place at least 1x per cycle. The max. deviation in synchronization is 20 μ s.

The status conditions must be exchanged crosswise through the SPI.

Logic processing:

The following evaluation must be made in both channels:

Signal A	Signal B	Result
Low	Low	False
High	Low	True
Low	High	True
High	High	True

5.12.2.7 HTL - Sensor

Signal level: 24V/0V
 Physical Layer: Push/Pull
 Measuring signal A/B track with 90° phase difference
 Max. counting pulse frequency: 200 kHz on X27/28 or X29/30
 (only PSCBR-C-10-SDM1/2)

Diagnoses:

Diagnose	Parameters	Fault threshold
Supply voltage monitoring	Fixed values 5 V, 8V, 10V, 12V, 20V, 24V	+/- 20 % +/-2 %(measuring tolerance)
Monitoring of differential level on input	Fixed value 24 V	+/- 20 % +/-2 %(measuring tolerance)
Monitoring of the counting signal separated for each track A/B	Fixed value	DP > 4 increments

5.12.2.8 Resolver

Measuring signal: SIN/COS – track with 90° phase difference
 Max. counting pulse frequency 2 kHz/pole
 Resolution: 9 bit / pole
Master-Mode:
 Frequency reference signal 8 kHz
Slave-Mode
 Frequency reference signal 6 - 16 kHz
 Reference signal form: Sinusoidal, triangle

¹⁾on X31/32

²⁾on X31/34

Diagnoses:

Diagnose	Parameters	Fault threshold
Monitoring of ratio	Fixed values 2:1, 3:2, 4:1	+/- 20 % +/-2 %(measuring tolerance)
Monitoring of signal amplitude SIN^2+COS^2	Fixed value	<2.8 V +/-5 % (measuring tolerance)
Monitoring of phases A/B	Fixed value 90°	+/- 7° +/-2°(measuring tolerance)
Monitoring of reference frequency	Fixed values 6 .. 12 kHz in steps of 1 kHz, 14 kHz, 16 kHz	+/- 20 % +/-5 %(measuring tolerance)
Form of reference signal	Sinusoidal, triangle, no monitoring	40 % form deviation
Monitoring of counting signal / signal phase quadrant	Fixed value	+/- 45°

6 Response times of the PSCBR

The response time is a very important safety related characteristic and must be strictly observed for each application / application related safety function. The following chapter lists the response times for individual functions, probably also in dependence on further parameters. If these data are insufficient for a specific application you should validate the actual time behaviour against the nominal behaviour by means of separate measurements. This applies also for the use of filter functions in particular.

Safety note:

- The response times must be determined for each application related safety function in nominal behaviour and must then be compared with the actual value by using the following data.
- Special care must be taken when using filter functions. Depending on the filter length / time the response time may be extended, which must be taken into account in the safety related design.
- In case of particularly critical problem formulations the temporal behaviour must be validated by means of measurements.
- During start-up of the device / alarm or fault reset the outputs may (depending on the application program) become active over the response time period. This must be taken into consideration when planning the safety function.

6.1 Response times in standard operation

The cycle time of the PSCBR system serves as basis for calculating the response times. In operation this is **T_{cycle} = 8 ms**. The specified response times comply with the corresponding maximum running time for the actual application within the PSCBR module. Depending on the application, further, application dependent response times of the sensors and actuators used must be added, in order to obtain the total running time.

Function	Response time [ms]	Explanation
Activation of a monitoring function by means of ENABLE with subsequent shut-down via digital output	24 *)	Activation of a monitoring function by means of the ENABLE signal.
Activation of a monitoring function by means of ENABLE with subsequent shut-down via safety relay	47 *)	Activation of a monitoring function by means of the ENABLE signal.
Response of an already activated monitoring function including PLC editing in case of position and speed processing via digital output	16 *)	With a monitoring function that has already been activated via ENABLE, the module requires <u>one</u> cycle to calculate the current speed value. During the next cycle after calculation of the monitoring function the information is further processed and output by the PLC, i.e. according to the implemented logic this will lead to e.g. switching of an output.

Function	Response time [ms]	Explanation
Response of an already activated monitoring function including PLC editing in case of position and speed processing via safety relays	39 *)	With a monitoring function that has already been activated via ENABLE, the module requires <u>one</u> cycle to calculate the current speed value. During the next cycle after calculation of the monitoring function the information is further processed and output by the PLC, i.e. according to the implemented logic this will lead to e.g. switching of an output.
Activation of digital output via digital input	16	Activation of an input and switching of the output
Activation output relay via digital input	26	Activation of an input and switching of the output
Deactivation of digital output via digital input	16	Deactivation of an input and thus deactivation of the output
Deactivation output relay via digital input	47	Deactivation of an input and thus deactivation of the output
Average filter (setting see encoder dialog SafePLC)	0 - 64	Group running time of the averager. This running time only effects the monitoring function in connection with position / speed / acceleration, but not the logic processing.
Analog filter <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 (2Hz) • 2 (2Hz) • 3 (2Hz) • 4 (4Hz) • 5 (6Hz) • 6 (8Hz) • 7 (10Hz) • 8 (20Hz) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 760 • 760 • 760 • 512 • 268 • 143 • 86 • 56 	The analog filter only affects the safe analog inputs of the PSCBR-12A module. Response times of the analog input filters in relation to the input frequency

Note:

*) : *) : When using an average filter the response time of this filter must also be added

6.2 Response time for FAST_CHANNEL

FAST_CHANNEL describes a characteristic of PSCBR to respond quicker to speed requirements than this would be possible with the execution of the safety programs in normal cycle (= 8 msec). The sensing time of FAST_CHANNEL is 2 msec.

The following response times can be specified:

- 4 msec (Worst Case Condition)

 **Safety note:**

- When using FAST_CHANNEL you should bear in mind that shutting down within the time specified above for a given speed threshold is only possible, if the sensor information has a sufficient resolution. The smallest resolvable switching threshold of the FAST_CHANNEL requires at least 2 edge changes on the corresponding sensor system within a period of 2 msec.
- This function can only be used in connection with semi-conductor outputs.

6.3 Response times for fault distance monitoring

The following calculation schematic applies for calculating the Worst Case condition.

System speed to the sampling instant	$V(t)$
System speed in case of PSCBR response:	$V_A(t)$
Monitoring threshold (SLS or SCA):	$V_S = \text{constant for all } t$
Parameterized filter value:	$XF = \text{constant for all } t$
Maximum possible acceleration of the application:	$a = \text{constant for all } t$
Deceleration after shut-down:	$a_v = \text{constant for all } t$
Sampling instant for occurrence of the Worst Case event:	T_{Fault}
Response time of the PSCBR systems:	t_{Response}

For the Worst Case assessment it is assumed that the drive will initially move exactly to the parameterized threshold with a speed $v(k)$ and then will accelerate to the maximum possible value a_0 .




Diagram: Behaviour of the drive with / without overspeed distance

Without overspeed distance the following connections result for the course of V and s.

Parameters	Calculation methods	Comment
$t_{Response}$	Value from the specified response time PSCBR + deceleration time in external shut-down chain	Deceleration time in external shut-off chain derived from relay/contactors and brake data, etc. issued by the manufacturer
a_F, a_V	n.a.	Estimation of the application
V_{a1}	$= V_s + a_F * t_{Response}$	

With overspeed distance the following connections result for the course of V and s.

Parameters	Calculation methods	Comment
t_{Response}	Value for response time data PSCBR + deceleration time in external shut-down chain	Deceleration time in external shut-off chain derived from relay/contactors and brake data, etc. issued by the manufacturer
a_F, a_V	n.a.	Estimation of the application
V_{a2}	$= a_F * t_{\text{Response}} + (V_S^2 + 2 * a_F * XF)^{1/2}$	

With its effect the filter displaces the set speed threshold V_a upwards by the amount **delta_v_filter**. For the application one must consider the new response time values ($T_{\text{react}} = T_{\text{PSCBR}} + T_{\text{filter}}$), as well as the speed at shut-down by PSCBR resulting from this.

6.4 Response times when using PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO

The cycle time of the PSCBR system serves as basis for calculating the response times. In operation this is **$T_{\text{cycle}} = 8 \text{ ms}$** . The specified response times comply with the corresponding maximum running time for the actual application within the PSCBR module. Depending on the application, further, application dependent response times of the sensors and actuators used must be added, in order to obtain the total running time.

Function	Designation	Response time [ms]	Explanation
Worst Case deceleration time inlet in basic module to PAE	$T_{\text{IN_BASE}}$	10	e.g. activation of a monitoring function by an input signal in the basic module
Worst Case deceleration time input PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO to PAE in basic module	$T_{\text{IN_31}}$	18	e.g. activation of a monitoring function by an input signal in the extension module PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO
Processing time PAE to PAA in basic module	T_{PLC}	8	Shut-down by a monitoring function or an input in PAE
Activation / deactivation digital output in basic module from PAA	$T_{\text{OUT_BASE}}$	-	Activation or deactivation of an output in the basic module after changes to the PAA.

<i>Function</i>	<i>Designation</i>	<i>Response time [ms]</i>	<i>Explanation</i>
Activation / deactivation digital output in extension module via PAA in basic module	T _{OUT_31}	8	Activation or deactivation of an output in the extension module PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO after changes to the PAA in the basic module.

Determination of the total response time

$$T_{TOTAL} = T_{IN} + T_{PLC} + T_{OUT}$$

Example 1:

Input to extension module, activation of SLS and processing in PLC, output to basic module.

$$T_{TOTAL} = T_{IN_31} + T_{PLC} + T_{OUT_Base} = 18 \text{ ms} + 8 \text{ ms} + 0 \text{ ms} = 24 \text{ ms};$$

Example 2:

Input to basic module, activation of SLS and processing in PLC, output to extension module.

$$T_{TOTAL} = T_{IN_Base} + T_{PLC} + T_{OUT_31} = 10 \text{ ms} + 8 \text{ ms} + 8 \text{ ms} = 26 \text{ ms};$$

Example 3:

Input to extension module, activation of SLS and processing in PLC, output to extension module.

$$T_{TOTAL} = T_{IN_31} + T_{PLC} + T_{OUT_31} = 18 \text{ ms} + 8 \text{ ms} + 8 \text{ ms} = 34 \text{ ms};$$

7 Start-up

7.1 Procedure

Start-up must only be performed by qualified personnel!
Strictly follow the safety regulations when commissioning!

7.2 Making sequences



The following phases are passed through and displayed by the front side seven segment display after each new start and fault-free running of the module:

7 segment display	Mode	Description
„1“	STARTUP	Synchronization between both processor systems and checking of configuration/firmware data
„2“	SENDCONFIG	Distribution of configuration/firmware data and renewed checking of these data. Subsequent area checking of configuration data.
„3“	STARTUP BUS	If available, initialization of a bus system
„4“	RUN	Normal system operation. All outputs are switched according to the current logic status.
„5“	STOP	In stop mode parameter and program data can be loaded externally.
„A“	ALARM	The alarm can be reset via the digital input or the front side reset button.
„E“	ECS-Alarm	The ECS alarm can be reset via the digital inputs or the front side reset button.
„F“	Fault	Fault can only be reset via ON/OFF of the module.

7.3 Reset-Function


The reset-function is divided into a startup-function after a power cycle (power off / on) and a status-/alarm-reset = internal reset-function. The internal reset is called by pushing the “Reset”-button on the PSCBR front panel or by a input port, configured as “Reset-Element” with active “Alarmreset”. The table below show a overview of those reset-functions:

7.3.1 Type of Reset-Functions

Reset-Typ	Triggering Element	Observation
General Reset	Power cycle (power off / on)	Reset-function after a complete power off / on
Internal Reset	 <p>Reset-Button</p>	Internal reset called by pushing the Reset-Button on the PSCBR front panel
	 <p>Reset-element</p>	Configuration of a reset-element

7.3.2 Reset-Timing

The reset-input for an internal reset is time monitored in „RUN“-mode. An internal reset is called by a falling edge of the reset-input under the pre-condition of $T < 3\text{sec}$ between raising / falling edge.




7.3.3 Reset-Function


Function block	General Reset	Internal Reset	Function
Fatal Error	X		Failure reset
Alarm	X	X	Alarm reset
Safe monitoring function	X	X	Reset of triggered safe monitoring functions
Flip-Flop	X	X	Dominant reset for 1 cycle
Timer	X	X	Timer = 0

After a reset the status of the safe monitoring functions is rebuilt


- ⇒ If process values are beyond the parameterized trigger points, the status of the safe monitoring functions is kept unchanged.
- ⇒ On time based functions, the timer value is reset and therefore the output status of the related function too. The function is triggered again if the time value versus monitored status exceeds again the parameterized limits.



Example 1 for process value based safe monitoring function (SOS with position monitoring) => no change in output status after reset if position is out of the parameterized limits.



Example 2 for process value based safe monitoring function (SOS with speed monitoring) => no change in output status after reset if speed exceeds the parameterized limits.



Example 3 for time based function (time monitored antivalent inputs) => Reset of the alarm, return of alarm status if time versus input status exceeds again the limits.

 Safety note:

- On time based functions, i.e. time based monitoring of complementary input signals, the reset-function cause a reset of a possible alarm status. Only if the time versus input status exceeds again the parameterized limits, the alarm status is recalled.
- For safeguarding of false utilization of the reset-function, i.e. reiterated call of the reset-function to bypass the alarm status, adequate measures in the application program (PLC-program) have to be implemented.

7.3.3.1 Example Reset-Function with safeguarding against false utilization

Function: On a machine for normal operation mode, the hazardous area shall be protected by a mechanical guard system. If in setup mode, the safety level is kept by a release button in conjunction with standstill monitoring respective safe limited speed.

The guard closed position is monitored by a sensor. With the guard in open position movement is only possible with the released button pressed.

On the application program this function is implemented by use of the function „door monitoring“ (2 channel mode with time monitoring) and the function “enabling switch”.

The logic signal „door monitoring“ is produced by computing of the input signals versus time monitoring. The time monitoring with an allowed difference on the expected input signals is fixed for 3 sec.

On the status “door open” (Signal “LOW” on output X23.1 and X23.2 (ID 369)) the axis can be moved with reduced speed if the enable button is on active status.

Task:

If a faulty cross connection is detected, the PSCBR device will show the alarm 6701.

The alarm can be quit, in result the Signal “Dorr monitoring” is kept correctly on “LOW” status.


After a reset the alarm 6701 will come back after 3 sec. if the wrong status is still applied.

If within this time frame the enable button is activated, the axis can be moved – on reduced speed only, but moved – for max. 3 sec.


The task is now to prevent a movement of the axis if the alarm will come potentially back after a reset.

Applicative measure:

By logic combination within the PLC-program the activation of the outputs by false utilization of the reset-function is prevented



Example 1: The release function of the outputs (ID 88) is additionally AND combined with a “Reset-Timer“. This timer prevents activation of the outputs for $T > 3\text{sec}$ after a call of the reset-function.



Example 2: The release function of the outputs (ID 88) is additionally AND combined with a FF (Flip-Flop) . This FF-element prevents activation of the outputs after a reset with still applied failures on the inputs. Just after a first correct detection of the input signals – both input lines on “HIGH” within 3 sec. – the outputs are released.

7.4 LED display

<i>Colour</i>	<i>Mode</i>	<i>Description</i>
green	"flashing"	System OK, configuration validated
yellow	"flashing"	System OK, configuration not yet validated
red	"flashing"	Alarm
red	"permanent"	Fatal Fault

Note:

For all operating states except RUN the outputs are rendered passive by the firmware, i.e. safely switched off. In status RUN the state of the outputs depend on the implemented PLC-program.

7.5 Parameterization

Parameterization takes place via the program SafePLC PSCBR. The transmission of these data to the module requires a programming adapter, the drivers of which must first be installed by the user.

Parameterization is described in the *programming manual*.

7.6 Function test

As a measure to ensure the safety of the module, the reliability of all safety functions must be checked once every year. For this purpose the modules used in the parameterization (inputs, outputs, monitoring functions and logic modules) must be checked with respect to function or shut-down.

See *programming manual*.

7.7 Validation

In order to assure the reliability of the implemented safety functions the user must check and document the parameters and links after the start-up and parameterization has taken place. This is supported by a validation assistant in the programming desktop (see chapter "Safety related examination").

8 Safety related examination

In order to assure the reliability of the implemented safety functions the user must check and document the parameters and links after the start-up and parameterization has taken place. This is supported by the parameterization software SafePLC PSCBR (see programming manual). On the first page one can enter general system data. The last page of the validation report contains individual evidence concerning the safety related examination.

Here the following entries are mandatory:

- Serial number (identical with the serial number on the type plate)
- Identity of the module

Here the responsible tester confirms that the CRC's displayed in the programming desktop are identical with the CRC stored in the PSCBR module.

Once all header data have been entered, the validation report can be generated by pressing the control button "Save". The parameterization tool then creates a text file (.TXT) with the file name of the program data set. The text file contains the following information:

- The 3 pages of header data edited above
- The configuration of the encoder
- The parameters of the existing monitoring function
- The PLC program as instruction list

After the transmission of the configuration and program data to the PSCBR module the status LED flashes yellow. This indicates that the configuration data have not yet been validated. Pressing the button "LOCK CONFIGURATION" at the end of the validation dialog highlights the data as "Validated" and the LED flashes in green.

9 Maintenance

9.1 Modification / handling changes to the device

Maintenance work must solely be carried out by qualified personnel.
Regular maintenance work is not required.

Repair

The devices must always be replaced as whole units
Repair work on the device can only be performed in the factory.

Warranty

By opening the module without permission the warranty will become null and void.

Note:

By modifying the module the safety approval will become null and void!

9.2 Exchanging a module

The following should be noted when exchanging a module:

Disconnect the electric power converter from the main supply.
Switch off the electric power supply for the device and disconnect.
Pull off the encoder plug.
Disconnect any other pluggable connections.
Take the module off the top hat rail and pack up EMC-compliant.
Mount the new module on the top hat rail.
Reconnect all connections.
Switch on the electric power converter.
Switch on the supply voltage.
Configure the device

Note:

Pluggable connections of the PSCBR module must generally not be disconnected or connected in live condition. There is a danger of sensor damage, particularly with connected position or speed sensors.

9.3 Maintenance intervals

Module replacement	See technical data
Function test	See chapter "Start-up"

10 Technical data

10.1 Environmental conditions

Class of protection	IP 52
Ambient temperature	0 °C* ... 50 °C
Climatic category	3 acc. to DIN 50 178
Lifetime	90000h at 50 °C ambient

10.2 Safety related characteristic data

Max. obtainable safety class	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SIL 3 acc. to EN61508 • Category 4 acc. to EN945-1 • Performance-Level e acc. to EN ISO 13849-1
System structure	2-channel with diagnose (1002)
Rating of operating mode	"high demand" acc. to EN 61508 (high demand rate)
Probability of an endangering failure per hour (PFH-value)	PSCBR-C-10, PSCBR-C-10-SDM1, PSCBR-C-10-SDM2 und PSCBR-C-10-SDM2A < 1,4 E-8 (14FIT)
Proof-Test-Interval (EN61508)	20 years, after this time the module must be replaced

11 Fault types PSCBR

The PSCBR generally differentiates between two types of faults as per assignment below:

Fault type	Description	Effect on the system	Reset condition
Fatal Fault	Severe exceptional fault caused by the program run in the PSCBR. Cyclic program sequence is no longer possible for safety related reasons. The last active process is the operation of the 7-segment display by system A.	All outputs are switched off!	Reset possible by switching the PSCBR(POR) off/on.
Alarm	Functional fault, caused by an external process. Both system continue to run cyclically and serve all requests from the communication interfaces. Sensing of the external process is also maintained.	All outputs are switched off!	Reset possible via parameterizable input
ECS-Alarm	When using the ECS function in the programming desktop, the encoder alarm messages are marked "E" instead of "A".	ECS function block delivers "0" as a result.	Reset possible via parameterizable input

Recognizing faults system, A and system B:

- System A: odd-numbered
- System B: even numbered

11.1 Fault indication

There are two possible ways of displaying the fault number

11.1.1 PSCBR.. without extension modules

F,A or E
 Fault number

11.1.2 PSCBR.. with expansion modules

F,A or E
 1) Fault number

- Note 1) 0: Base module
1: Expansion module with logic address 1
2: Expansion module with logic address 2

11.2 Alarm List PSCBR

A 2101 / A 2102

Alarm message	Timeout receive message PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO (address 1)
Cause	Message from expansion module not received in time
Remedy	Check connection to expansion module

A 2105 / A 2106

Alarm message	CRC fault transmission message PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO (address 1)
Cause	Transmission message faulty
Remedy	Check configuration of PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO serial number

A 2107 / A 2108

Alarm message	CRC fault transmission message
Cause	Transmission message faulty
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Check configuration of PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO serial number• Check connection to expansion module

A 2109 / A 2110

Alarm message	CRC fault receive message
Cause	Receive message faulty
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Check configuration of PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO serial number• Check connection to expansion module

A 2111

Alarm message	Timeout communication with expansion module PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO (address 1)
Cause	Installation of expansion module faulty
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Check connection to expansion module

A 2113

Alarm message	Expansion module PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO (address 1) present, but not configured
Cause	Faulty configuration
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Check configuration

A 2115 / A2116

Alarm message	Extension module PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO has a faulty logic address
Cause	Faulty configuration
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Check configuration

A 2121 / A 2122

Alarm message Timeout receive message PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO (address 2)
Cause Message from expansion module not received in time
Remedy Check connection to expansion module

A 2125 / A 2126

Alarm message CRC fault transmission message PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO (address 2)
Cause Transmission message faulty
Remedy Check configuration of PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO serial number

A 2131

Alarm message Timeout communication with expansion module PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO (address 2)
Cause Installation of expansion module faulty
Remedy

- Check connection to expansion module

A 2133

Alarm message Expansion module PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO (address 2) present, but not configured
Cause Faulty configuration
Remedy

- Check configuration

A 3031 / A 3032

Alarm message Pulse1 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.1
Cause Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.
Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3033 / A 3034

Alarm message Pulse2 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.1
Cause Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.
Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3035 / A 3036

Alarm message Faulty 24V signal on EAEx.1
Cause No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input
Remedy

- Check the voltage on the digital input!
- Check wiring
- Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3037 / A 3038

Alarm message Pulse1 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.2
Cause Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.

- Remedy
- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
 - Check wiring

A 3039 / A 3040

- Alarm message
Cause
- Pulse2 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.2
Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.
- Remedy
- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
 - Check wiring

A 3041 / A 3042

- Alarm message
Cause
- Faulty 24V signal on EAEx.2
No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input
- Remedy
- Check the voltage on the digital input!
 - Check wiring
 - Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3043 / A 3044

- Alarm message
Cause
- Pulse1 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.3
Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.
- Remedy
- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
 - Check wiring

A 3045 / A 3046

- Alarm message
Cause
- Pulse2 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.3
Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.
- Remedy
- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
 - Check wiring

A 3047 / A 3048

- Alarm message
Cause
- Faulty 24V signal on EAEx.3
No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input
- Remedy
- Check the voltage on the digital input!
 - Check wiring
 - Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3049 / A 3050

- Alarm message
Cause
- Pulse1 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.4
Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.
- Remedy
- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
 - Check wiring

A 3051 / A 3052

Alarm message	Pulse2 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.4
Cause	Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram • Check wiring

A 3053 / A 3054

Alarm message	Faulty 24V signal on EAEx.4
Cause	No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the voltage on the digital input! • Check wiring • Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3055 / A 3056

Alarm message	Pulse1 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.5
Cause	Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram • Check wiring

A 3057 / A 3058

Alarm message	Pulse2 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.5
Cause	Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram • Check wiring

A 3059 / A 3060

Alarm message	Faulty 24V signal on EAEx.5
Cause	No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the voltage on the digital input! • Check wiring • Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3061 / A 3062

Alarm message	Pulse1 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.6
Cause	Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram • Check wiring

A 3063 / A 3064

Alarm message	Pulse2 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.6
Cause	Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram • Check wiring

A 3065 / A 3066

Alarm message

Cause

Faulty 24V signal on EAEx.6

No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the voltage on the digital input!
- Check the wiring!
- Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3067 / A 3068

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse1 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.7

Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3069 / A 3070

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse2 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.7

Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3071 / A 3072

Alarm message

Cause

Faulty 24V signal on EAEx.7

No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the voltage on the digital input!
- Check wiring
- Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3073 / A 3074

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse1 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.8

Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3075 / A 3076

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse2 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.8

Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3077 / A 3078

Alarm message

Cause

Faulty 24V signal on EAEx.8

No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the voltage on the digital input!
- Check wiring
- Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3079 / A 3080

Alarm message	Pulse1 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.9
Cause	Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram • Check wiring

A 3081 / A 3082

Alarm message	Pulse2 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.9
Cause	Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram • Check wiring

A 3083 / A 3084

Alarm message	Faulty 24V signal on EAEx.9
Cause	No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the voltage on the digital input! • Check wiring • Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3085 / A 3086

Alarm message	Pulse1 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.10
Cause	Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram • Check wiring

A 3087 / A 3088

Alarm message	Pulse2 plausibility fault on expansion inlet EAEx.10
Cause	Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram • Check wiring

A 3089 / A 3090

Alarm message	Faulty 24V signal on EAEx.10
Cause	No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the voltage on the digital input! • Check wiring • Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3101 / A 3102

Alarm message	Pulse1 plausibility fault on input DI1
Cause	Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram • Check wiring

A 3103 / A 3104

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse1 plausibility fault on input DI2
Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3105 / A 3106

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse1 plausibility fault on input DI3
Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3107 / A 3108

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse1 plausibility fault on input DI4
Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3109 / A 3110

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse1 plausibility fault on input DI5
Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3111 / A 3112

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse1 plausibility fault on input DI6
Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3113 / A 3114

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse1 plausibility fault on input DI7
Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3115 / A 3116

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse1 plausibility fault on input DI8
Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3117 / A 3118

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse2 plausibility fault on input DI1
No Pulse2 voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3119 / A 3120

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse2 plausibility fault on input DI2
No Pulse2 voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3121 / A 3122

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse2 plausibility fault on input DI3
No Pulse2 voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3123 / A 3124

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse2 plausibility fault on input DI4
No Pulse2 voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3125 / A 3126

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse2 plausibility fault on input DI5
No Pulse2 voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3127 / A 3128

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse2 plausibility fault on input DI6
No Pulse2 voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3129 / A 3130

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse2 plausibility fault on input DI7
No Pulse2 voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3131 / A 3132

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse2 plausibility fault on input DI8
No Pulse2 voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3133 / A 3134

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse1 plausibility fault on input DI9
Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3135 / A 3136

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse1 plausibility fault on input DI10
Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3137 / A 3138

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse1 plausibility fault on input DI11
Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3139 / A 3140

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse1 plausibility fault on input DI12
Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3141 / A 3142

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse1 plausibility fault on input DI13
Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3143 / A 3144

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse1 plausibility fault on input DI14
Configured Pulse1 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3147 / A 3148

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse2 plausibility fault on input DI9
Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input DI9 acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3149 / A 3150

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse2 plausibility fault on input DI10
Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input DI10 acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3151 / A 3152

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse2 plausibility fault on input DI11
Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input DI11 acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3153 / A 3154

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse2 plausibility fault on input DI12
Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3155 / A 3156

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse2 plausibility fault on input DI13
Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3157 / A 3158

Alarm message

Cause

Pulse2 plausibility fault on input DI14
Configured Pulse2 voltage not applied to this input.

Remedy

- Check the configuration of the digital input acc. to planning and circuit diagram
- Check wiring

A 3159 / A 3160

Alarm message

Cause

Faulty 24V signal on DI1
No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the voltage on the digital input!
- Check wiring
- Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3161 / A 3162

Alarm message

Cause

Faulty 24V signal on DI2

No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the voltage on the digital input!
- Check wiring
- Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3163 / A 3164

Alarm message

Cause

Faulty 24V signal on DI3

No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the voltage on the digital input!
- Check wiring
- Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3165 / A 3166

Alarm message

Cause

Faulty 24V signal on DI4

No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the voltage on the digital input!
- Check wiring
- Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3167 / A 3168

Alarm message

Cause

Faulty 24V signal on DI5

No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the voltage on the digital input!
- Check wiring
- Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3169 / A 3170

Alarm message

Cause

Faulty 24V signal on DI6

No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the voltage on the digital input!
- Check wiring
- Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3171 / A 3172

Alarm message

Cause

Faulty 24V signal on DI7

No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the voltage on the digital input!
- Check wiring
- Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3173 / A 3174

Alarm message

Cause

Faulty 24V signal on DI8

No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input

Remedy

- Check the voltage on the digital input!
- Check wiring
- Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3175 / A 3176

Alarm message

Cause

Remedy

Faulty 24V signal on DI9

No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input

- Check the voltage on the digital input!
- Check wiring
- Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3177 / A 3178

Alarm message

Cause

Remedy

Faulty 24V signal on DI10

No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input

- Check the voltage on the digital input!
- Check wiring
- Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3179 / A 3180

Alarm message

Cause

Remedy

Faulty 24V signal on DI11

No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input

- Check the voltage on the digital input!
- Check wiring
- Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3181 / A 3182

Alarm message

Cause

Remedy

Faulty 24V signal on DI12

No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input

- Check the voltage on the digital input!
- Check wiring
- Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3183 / A 3184

Alarm message

Cause

Remedy

Faulty 24V signal on DI13

No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input

- Check the voltage on the digital input!
- Check wiring
- Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3185 / A 3186

Alarm message

Cause

Remedy

Faulty 24V signal on DI14

No permanent 24V voltage applied to this input

- Check the voltage on the digital input!
- Check wiring
- Check whether Pulse1 or Pulse2 is applied

A 3191 / A 3192

Alarm message

Cause

Remedy

Short-circuit fault digital inPorts

Short circuit between the digital inPorts within a module

Consult the manufacturer

A 3197 / A 3198

Alarm message
Cause
Remedy

Faulty OSSD input test
OSSD test faulty

- 24V check the input voltage on all OSSD inputs

A 3209 / A 3210

Fault message

Encoder supply voltage X31 faulty.

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encoder supply voltage does not comply with configured threshold • Component fault in module
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check configuration! • Check encoder supply voltage • Switch device off/on.

A 3213 / A 3214

Fault message

Encoder supply voltage X32 faulty.

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encoder supply voltage does not comply with configured threshold • Component fault in module
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check configuration! • Check encoder supply voltage • Switch device off/on.

A 3225 / A 3226

Fault message

Deviation Ain1 to Ain2 too big

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Different voltages on both inputs • configured threshold too low
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check voltages on Ain1! • Check configuration of threshold/input filter • Switch device off/on.

A 3227 / A 3228

Fault message

Deviation Ain3 to Ain4 too big

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Different voltages on both inputs • configured threshold too low
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check voltages on Ain1! • Check configuration of threshold/input filter • Switch device off/on.

A 3229 / A 3230

Fault message

Plausibility test for encoder voltage faulty

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encoder voltage value
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check encoder voltage supply • Check wiring of encoder voltage supply

A 3231 / A 3232

Fault message	Plausibility test for analog inputs faulty
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fault in analog input signal
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check connection of analog inputs • Analog input voltage out of range

A 3233 / A 3234

Fault message	Open-circuit monitoring AIN1 has triggered
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open-circuit monitoring activated (< 1000 mV)
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check configuration of activation/sensor • Check sensor connection

A 3235 / A 3236

Fault message	Open-circuit monitoring AIN2 has triggered
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open-circuit monitoring activated (< 1000 mV)
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check configuration of activation/sensor • Check sensor connection

A 3301 / A 3302

Alarm message	Plausibility fault speed sensing axis 1
Cause	<p>The difference between the two speed sensors is higher than the configured speed shut-down threshold</p> <p>Check the theory of the distance once again using the data set in the encoder configuration</p>
Remedy	<p>Check the speed sensor</p> <p>Use the SCOPE function to adjust superimposable speed signals</p>

A 3303 / A 3304

Alarm message	Plausibility fault position sensing axis 1
Cause	<p>The difference between the two position sensors is higher than the configured incremental shut-down threshold</p> <p>Check the theory of the distance using the configured data or the sensor setting</p>
Remedy	<p>Check the position signal</p> <p>Are all signals correctly connected to the 9-pole encoder plug?</p> <p>Check the encoder plug for correct wiring.</p> <p>If proximity switches are used, these are correctly connected.</p> <p>Use the SCOPE function to adjust superimposable position signals</p>

A 3307 / A 3308

Alarm message	Plausibility fault position range axis 1
Cause	The current position is outside the configured measuring length

Remedy
 Check the theory of the distance using the configured data or the sensor setting
 Check the position signal, if necessary correct the offset
 Use the SCOPE function to read out the position and to set into relation to configured values

A 3309 / A 3310

Alarm message
 Cause
 Remedy
 Plausibility fault because of faulty speed axis 1
 The current speed is outside the configured maximum speed
 The drive moves outside the permissible and configured speed range
 Check configuration
 Use the SCOPE function to analyse the course of speed

A 3311 / A 3312

Alarm message
 Cause
 Remedy
 Configuration fault: Acceleration axis 1
 The current acceleration is outside the configured acceleration range
 The drive has exceeded the permissible acceleration range
 Check the configuration of maximum speed
 Use the SCOPE function to analyse the course of speed/acceleration

A 3313 / A 3314

Fault message	SSI sensor fault
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Encoder step change SSI-value within a cycle too big
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Check encoder wiring Check encoder configuration

A 3318

Fault message	Incremental encoder axis 1 faulty
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Track A does not match track B
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Check encoder wiring Check encoder configuration

A 3321 / A 3322

Alarm message
 Cause
 Remedy
 Plausibility fault speed sensing axis 2
 The difference between the two speed sensors is higher than the configured speed shut-down threshold
 Check the theory of the distance once again using the data set in the encoder configuration
 Check the speed sensor
 Use the SCOPE function to adjust superimposable speed signals

A 3323 / A 3324

Alarm message
 Cause
 Plausibility fault position sensing axis 2
 The difference between the two position sensors is higher than the configured incremental shut-down threshold

Remedy

Check the theory of the distance using the configured data or the sensor setting
 Check the position signal
 Are all signals correctly connected to the 9-pole encoder plug?
 Check the encoder plug for correct wiring.
 If proximity switches are used, these are correctly connected.
 Use the SCOPE function to adjust superimposable position signals

A 3327 / A 3328

Alarm message
 Cause

Plausibility fault position range axis 2
 The current position is outside the configured measuring length
 Check the theory of the distance using the configured data or the sensor setting

Remedy

Check the position signal, if necessary correct the offset
 Use the SCOPE function to read out the position and to set into relation to configured values

A 3329 / A 3330

Alarm message
 Cause

Plausibility fault because of faulty speed axis 2
 The current speed is outside the configured maximum speed
 The drive moves outside the permissible and configured speed range

Remedy

Check configuration
 Use the SCOPE function to analyse the course of speed

A 3331 / A 3332

Alarm message
 Cause

Configuration fault: Acceleration axis 2
 The current acceleration is outside the configured acceleration range
 The drive has exceeded the permissible acceleration range

Remedy

Check the configuration of maximum speed
 Use the SCOPE function to analyse the course of speed/acceleration

A 3333 / A 3334

Alarm message
 Cause

Plausibility fault of SinCos encoder
 Wrong encoder type connected

Remedy

Check configuration
 Check encoder assignment

A 3337 / A3338

Fault message	Incremental encoder axis 2 faulty
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Track A does not match track B
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Check encoder wiring Check encoder configuration

A 3407 / A 3408

Alarm message
 Cause

Difference level RS485Treiber1 fault INC_B or SSI_CLK faulty

- No encoder connection
- Wrong encoder type connected
- Check encoder connection
- Check encoder wiring

Remedy

A 3409 / A 3410

Alarm message	Difference level RS485Treiber2 fault INC_A or SSI_DATA faulty
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No encoder connection • Wrong encoder type connected
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check encoder connection • Check encoder wiring

A 3411 / A 3412

Fault message	Fault Sine/Cosine plausibility X31
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Plausibility monitoring of individual tracks faulty
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check encoder wiring • Sine- to Cosine- track must be linear

A 3413 / A 3414

Fault message	Fault Sine/Cosine plausibility X32
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Plausibility monitoring of individual tracks faulty
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check encoder wiring • Sine- to Cosine- track must be linear

A 3451 / A 3452

Alarm message	Faulty resolver frequency
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resolver frequency outside the permissible range. Exciter frequency fault in resolver.
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the resolver frequency if it is within the permissible range.

A 3453 / A3454

Fault message	Mean value of the resolver reference signal is outside the permissible range.
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mean value of the resolver reference signal is outside the permissible range.
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the connected resolver.

A 3457 / A3458

Fault message	Reference voltage of the extension board is faulty
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HW fault in the extension board
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the extension board

A 3459 / A3460

Fault message	The amplitude/pointer length formed from the two signals sine and cosine (see also unit circle) is outside the permissible range.
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incorrect encoder configuration • Incorrect resolver connection
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the encoder configuration • Check the resolver connections

A 3461 / A3462

Fault message The PIC reports a general status fault, e.g. when setting up a connection or because a timeout occurred during processing.

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal fault
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Power cycle of the device • Check the extension board

A 3463 / A3464

Fault message Plausibility test between the analog sine signal and the TTL-level at the Schmitt-trigger output do not match.

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Faulty encoder signals from the encoder
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the encoder connection • Check the encoder signal

A 3465 / A3466

Fault message The quotient of arithmetic mean value / square mean value is outside the permissible range.

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Faulty encoder signals from encoder
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the encoder connection • Check the encoder signal

A 3467 / A3468

Fault message Connection setup between CPU and PIC failed.

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Faulty HW of the extension board
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the extension board

A 3469 / A3470

Fault message Resolver_Quadrant

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Faulty encoder signals from the encoder
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the encoder connection • Check the encoder signal

A 3471 / A3472

Fault message Resolver_UENC

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No voltage applied to the extension board
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check whether voltage is correctly applied to the terminals of the extension board.

A 3473 / A3474

Fault message TTL/HTL signal faulty

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Faulty encoder signals from the encoder
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the encoder connection • Check the encoder signal

A 3475 / A3476

Fault message Resolver_TRACE Fault

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Counting signals of the encoder are incorrect
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Check the encoder connection Check the encoder signal Check the extension board

A 3505 / A 3506

Fault message Read head fault WCS encoder system axis 1

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WCS read head has detected a fault
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Read out fault types from WCS encoder system

A 3507 / A 3508

Fault message Read head fault WCS encoder system axis 1

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WCS read head has detected a fault
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Read out fault types from WCS encoder system

A 3551 / A3552

Fault message SSI_ECE STATUS 1. axis SSI Ext Encoder

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation of the 1st status bit is faulty
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Check the encoder connection Check the encoder signal Replace the SSI-encoder

A 3553 / A3554

Fault message SSI_ECE STATUS 1. axis SSI Ext Encoder

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation of the 2nd status bit is faulty
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Check the encoder connection Check the encoder signal Replace the SSI-encoder

A 3555 / A3556

Fault message SSI_ECE STATUS 1. axis SSI Ext Encoder

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation of the 3rd status bit is faulty
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Check the encoder connection Check the encoder signal Replace the SSI-encoder

A 3557 / A3558

Fault message SSI_ECE STATUS 1. axis SSI Ext Encoder

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation of the 4th status bit is faulty
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Check the encoder connection Check the encoder signal Replace the SSI-encoder

A 3559 / A3560

Fault message SSI_ECE STATUS 1. axis SSI Ext Encoder

Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation of the 5th status bit is faulty
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Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the encoder connection • Check the encoder signal • Replace the SSI-encoder
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A 3561 / A3562

Fault message	SSI_ECE STATUS 2. axis SSI Ext Encoder
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of the 1st status bit is faulty
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the encoder connection • Check the encoder signal • Replace the SSI-encoder

A 3563 / A3564

Fault message	SSI_ECE STATUS 2. axis SSI Ext Encoder
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of the 2nd status bit is faulty
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the encoder connection • Check the encoder signal • Replace the SSI-encoder

A 3565 / A3566

Fault message	SSI_ECE STATUS 2. axis SSI Ext Encoder
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of the 3rd status bit is faulty
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the encoder connection • Check the encoder signal • Replace the SSI-encoder

A 3567 / A3568

Fault message	SSI_ECE STATUS 2. axis SSI Ext Encoder
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of the 4th status bit is faulty
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the encoder connection • Check the encoder signal • Replace the SSI-encoder

A 3569 / A3570

Fault message	SSI_ECE STATUS 2. axis SSI Ext Encoder
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of the 5th status bit is faulty
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the encoder connection • Check the encoder signal • Replace the SSI-encoder

A 3571 / A3572

Fault message	SSI STATUS 1. axis SSI Encoder
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of the 1st status bit is faulty
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the encoder connection • Check the encoder signal • Replace the SSI-encoder

A 3573 / A3574

Fault message		SSI STATUS 1. axis SSI Encoder
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of the 2nd status bit is faulty 	
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the encoder connection • Check the encoder signal • Replace the SSI-encoder 	

A 3575 / A3576

Fault message		SSI STATUS 1. axis SSI Encoder
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of the 3rd status bit is faulty 	
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the encoder connection • Check the encoder signal • Replace the SSI-encoder 	

A 3577 / A3578

Fault message		SSI STATUS 1. axis SSI Encoder
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of the 4th status bit is faulty 	
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the encoder connection • Check the encoder signal • Replace the SSI-encoder 	

A 3579 / A3580

Fault message		SSI STATUS 1. axis SSI Encoder
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of the 5th status bit is faulty 	
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the encoder connection • Check the encoder signal • Replace the SSI-encoder 	

A 3801 / A3802

Fault message		Faulty switching of output EAAx.1
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"	
Remedy	Switch device off/on	

A 3803 / A3804

Fault message		Faulty switching of output EAAx.2
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"	
Remedy	Switch device off/on	

A 3805 / A3806

Fault message		Faulty switching of output EAAx.3
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"	
Remedy	Switch device off/on	

A 3807 / A3808

Fault message	Faulty switching of output EAAx.4
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Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

A 3809 / A3810

Fault message	Faulty switching of output EAAx.5
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

A 3811 / A3812

Fault message	Faulty switching of output EAAx.6
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

A 3813 / A3814

Fault message	Faulty switching of output EAAx.7
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

A 3815 / A3816

Fault message	Faulty switching of output EAAx.8
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

A 3817 / A3818

Fault message	Faulty switching of output EAAx.9
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

A 3819 / A3820

Fault message	Faulty switching of output EAAx.10
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

A 4001 / A 4002

Alarm message	CCW and CW rotation monitoring SDI1 activated at the same time
Cause	Multiple activation
Remedy	In programming make sure that only one "Enable" is activated at a time

A 4003 / A 4004

Alarm message	CCW and CW rotation monitoring SDI2 activated at the same time
Cause	Multiple activation

Remedy In programming make sure that only one "Enable" is activated at a time

A 4601 / A 4602

Alarm message Monitoring range left and right of SLP1 activated at the same time
Cause Multiple activation
Remedy In programming make sure that only one "Enable" is activated at a time

A 4603 / A 4604

Alarm message Monitoring range left and right of SLP2 activated at the same time
Cause Multiple activation
Remedy In programming make sure that only one "Enable" is activated at a time

A 4605 / A 4606

Alarm message SLP1 Teach In status fault
Cause SET and QUIT input have a faulty switching sequence
Remedy Check input configuration
Check switching sequence

A 4607 / A 4608

Alarm message SLP 2 Teach In status fault
Cause SET and QUIT input have a faulty switching sequence
Remedy Check configuration
Check switching sequence

A 4609 / A 4610

Alarm message SLP1 Teach In position fault
Cause Teach In position outside measuring range
Remedy Check transfer position

A 4611 / A 4612

Alarm message SLP2 Teach In position fault
Cause Teach In position outside measuring range
Remedy Check transfer position

A 4613 / A 4614

Alarm message SLP1 Teach In SOS activation fault
Cause The drive moved during Teach In (SOS fault)
Remedy The drive must be stopped when using the Teach In function
Check whether SOS has already triggered

A 4615 / A 4616

Alarm message SLP 2 Teach In SOS activation fault
Cause The drive moved during Teach In (SOS fault)
Remedy The drive must be stopped when using the Teach In function
Check whether SOS has already triggered

A 4901 / A 4902

Alarm message CCW and CW rotation monitoring SLI1 activated at the same time
 Cause Multiple activation
 Remedy In programming make sure that only one "Enable" is activated at a time

A 4903 / A 4904

Alarm message CCW and CW rotation monitoring SLI2 activated at the same time
 Cause Multiple activation
 Remedy In programming make sure that only one "Enable" is activated at a time

A 5001 / A 5002

Alarm message Test deactivation of digital inputs 1...14 faulty
 Cause Inputs are still active after deactivation
 Remedy Check wiring of digital inputs

A 6701 / A 6702

Alarm message Timeout fault MET
 Cause Input element with time monitoring is faulty
 Remedy Check wiring of input element
 Input element faulty

A 6703 / A 6704

Alarm message Timeout fault MEZ
 Cause Two-hand control element with time monitoring is faulty
 Remedy Check wiring of input element
 Input element faulty

11.3 Fatal Fault list PSCBR

F 1001

Fault message Configuration data were incorrectly loaded into the monitoring device
 Cause Disturbed connection when loading the program into the monitoring device.

Remedy	Reload the configuration data, then switch module off/on.
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F 1003

Fault message Configuration data invalid for software version of module!
 Cause Module configured with incorrect software version of the programming desktop.

Remedy	Parameterize the module with the approved version of the programming desktop, the switch the module off/on.
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F 1007

Fault message	Device not programmed with the correct programming desktop
Cause	Program or configuration data transferred to the device using the wrong programming desktop
Remedy	Check the module design and parameterize again with a valid programming desktop. Then switch device off/on.

F 1307

Fault message Fault when deleting configuration data from the Flash Memory

F 1311 / F1312

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 1314

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 1330

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 1401 / F 1402

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 1403 / F 1404

Fault message	CRC of configuration data invalid!
Cause	Configuration data were incorrectly transferred
Remedy	Transfer the configuration data again

F 1406

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 1407 / F 1408

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 1501 / F 1502

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 1503 / F 1504

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 1505 / F 1506

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

Fault message **F 1601 / F 1602**
Range test of device description is faulty.

Fault message **F 1603 / F 1604**
Range test of Access Data faulty

Fault message **F 1605 / F 1606**
Range test of EMU faulty

Fault message **F 1607 / F 1608**
Range test SCA faulty

Fault message **F 1609 / F 1610**
Range test SSX faulty

Fault message **F 1611 / F 1612**
Range test SEL faulty

Fault message **F 1613 / F 1614**
Range test SLP faulty

Fault message **F 1615 / F 1616**
Range test SOS faulty

Fault message **F 1617 / F 1618**
Range test SLS faulty

Fault message **F 1619 / F 1620**
Range test SDI faulty

Fault message **F 1621 / F 1622**
Range test SLI faulty

Fault message **F 1623 / F 1624**
Range test of PLC faulty

Fault message **F 1625 / F 1626**
Range test of shut-down channel faulty

F 1627 / F 1628

Fault message Range test of outputs faulty

F 1629 / F 1630

Fault message Range test of digital inputs faulty.

F 1631 / F 1632

Fault message	Range test of analog input
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F 1633 / F 1634

Fault message Range test of encoder type faulty

F 1635 / F 1636

Fault message Range test of encoder processing faulty

F 1637 / F 1638

Fault message Range test of encoder position faulty

F 1639 / F 1640

Fault message Range test of PDM faulty.

F 1641 / F 1642

Fault message Range test of adder circuitry faulty

F 1645 / F 1646

Fault message Range test of axis management faulty

F 1647 / F 1648

Fault message	Range test of expansion modules faulty
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F 1649 / F 1650

Fault message	Range test of PLC timer faulty
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F 1651 / F 1652

Fault message	Range test of system faulty
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F 1653 / F 1654

Fault message	Range test connection table faulty
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F 1655 / F 1656

Fault message	Range test SAC faulty
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F 1657 / F 1658

Fault message	Range test of diagnose faulty
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F 2001 / F 2002

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 2003 / F 2004

Fault message Timeout when transmitting configuration and firmware data

F 2005

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 2007

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 2009

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 2011

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 2013 / F 2014

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 3001 / F 3002

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 3201 / F 3202

Fault message	Processor voltage 2.5V outside defined range
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supply voltage for module not correct! • Component fault in module
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check device supply voltage! • Switch device off/on.

F 3203

Fault message	Supply voltage 24V module faulty.
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supply voltage for module not correct! • Component fault in module

Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check device supply voltage! • Switch device off/on.
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F 3204

Fault message	Internal supply voltage 5.7V faulty
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supply voltage for module not correct! • Component fault in module
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check device supply voltage! • Switch device off/on.

F 3217 / F 3218

Fault message	Internal supply voltage 5V faulty
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supply voltage for module not correct! • Component fault in module
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check device supply voltage! • Switch device off/on.

F 3306

Alarm message	Plausibility fault position switching axis 1
Cause	During position switching SOS, SLI or SDI is permanently activated. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check activation of SOS
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check activation of SLI • Activation of SDI (only for monitoring via position)

F 3316

Fault message	Fault in encoder alignment axis 1
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incorrect position triggering by system A
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check encoder configuration • Switch device off/on.

F 3326

Fault message	Plausibility fault position switching axis 2
Cause	During position switching SOS, SLI or SDI is permanently activated. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check activation of SOS
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check activation of SLI • Activation of SDI (only for monitoring via position)

F 3336

Fault message	Fault in encoder alignment axis 2
Cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incorrect position triggering by system A
Remedy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check encoder configuration • Switch device off/on.

F 3603 / F 3604

Fault message	Faulty switching of relay K1
Cause	Internal triggering of relay faulty

Remedy	Switch device off/on
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F 3605 / F 3606

Fault message	Faulty switching of relay K2
Cause	Internal triggering of relay faulty
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3609

Fault message	Faulty switching of "0V" driver DO1_L
Cause	Switching state of output faulty
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3610

Fault message	Faulty switching of "24V" driver DO1_H
Cause	Switching state of output faulty
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3611

Fault message	Faulty switching of "0V" driver DO2_L
Cause	Switching state of output faulty
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3612

Fault message	Faulty switching of "24V" driver DO2_H
Cause	Switching state of output faulty
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3613

Fault message	Faulty switching of "0V" driver DO1_L
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3614

Fault message	Faulty testing of "24V" driver DO1_H
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3615

Fault message	Faulty testing of "0V" driver DO2_L
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3616

Fault message	Faulty testing of "24V" driver DO2_H
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3617

Fault message	Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!
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F 3618

Fault message	Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!
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F 3619

Fault message	Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!
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F 3620

Fault message	Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!
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F 3621

Fault message	Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!
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F 3622

Fault message	Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!
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F 3701 / F 3702

Fault message	Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!
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F 3821

Fault message	Faulty switching of output EAAx.1
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3823

Fault message	Faulty switching of output EAAx.2
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3825

Fault message	Faulty switching of output EAAx.3
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3827

Fault message	Faulty switching of output EAAx.4
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3829

Fault message	Faulty switching of output EAAx.5
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3831

Fault message	Faulty switching of output EAAx.6
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3833

Fault message	Faulty switching of output EAAx.7
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3835

Fault message	Faulty switching of output EAAx.8
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3837

Fault message	Faulty switching of output EAAx.9
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3839

Fault message	Faulty switching of output EAAx.10
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3841 / F 3842

Fault message	Faulty testing of output EAAx.1
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3843 / F 3844

Fault message	Faulty testing of output EAAx.2
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3845 / F 3846

Fault message	Faulty testing of output EAAx.3
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3847 / F 3848

Fault message	Faulty testing of output EAAx.4
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3849 / F 3850

Fault message	Faulty testing of output EAAx.5
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3851 / F 3852

Fault message	Faulty testing of output EAAx.6
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3853 / F 3854

Fault message	Faulty testing of output EAAx.7
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3855 / F 3856

Fault message	Faulty testing of output EAAx.8
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3857 / F 3858

Fault message	Faulty testing of output EAAx.9
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3859 / F 3860

Fault message	Faulty testing of output EAAx.10
Cause	Short-circuit of outPort with "24V" or "0V"
Remedy	Switch device off/on

F 3872

Fault message	Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!
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F 3874
Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 3892
Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 3894
Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 4501 / F 4502
Alarm message Faulty calculation of SSX brake ramp
Cause Faulty configuration
Remedy

- Check SSX configuration
- Consult the manufacturer

F 4503 / F 4504
Alarm message Faulty calculation of SSX limit curve
Cause Faulty calculation of SSX limit curve
Remedy

- Check configuration
- Consult the manufacturer

F 6801 / F 6802
Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 6803 / F 6804
Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 6805 / F 6806
Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 6807 / F 6808
Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 6809 / F 6810
Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 6811 / F 6812
Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 6813 / F 6814

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 8205 / F 8206

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 8207 / F 8208

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 8213 / F 8214

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 8220

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 8221 / F 8222

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 8223 / F 8224

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 8225

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 8227

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 8228

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 9001 / F 9002

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 9007 / F 9008

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 9009 / F 9010

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 9011 / F 9012

Fault message Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 9013 / F 9014

Fault message

Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 9015 / F 9016

Fault message

Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

F 9017 / F 9018

Fault message

Internal fault – please contact the manufacturer!

12 Encoder types









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								1-channel partial system	2-channel partial system dynamic	2-channel partial system non-dynamic (standstill monitoring)
69	NC	NC	1 x Bero + 1 x Bero	X			Fault exclusion mech. shaft breakage, positive encoder shaft connection required, if common elements are in use.	n.a.	99%	80-90%
1	Incremental	NC	NC	X			Fault exclusion mech. shaft breakage, positive encoder shaft connection required	60%	99%	80-90%
51	Incremental	Incremental	NC	X	X			n.a.	99%	95%
3	Incremental	NC	1 x Bero	X				n.a.	99%	90-95%
68	Incremental	NC	2 x Bero 90°	X	X			n.a.	99%	90-95%
62	Incremental	SIN/COS	NC	X	X			n.a.	99%	99%
54	Incremental	HTL	NC	X	X			n.a.	99%	90-95%







No.	Type <i>Encoder to interface X31/32</i>	Type <i>Encoder to interface X31/34</i>	Type <i>Encoder to X 23</i>	Safe speed	Safe direction	Safe position	Fault exclusion	DC		
								1-channel partial system	2-channel partial system dynamic	2-channel partial system non-dynamic (standstill monitoring)
58	Incremental	Resolver	NC	X	X			n.a.	99%	99%
65	Incremental	SSI	NC	X	X	X		n.a.	99%	90-95%
2	SIN/COS	NC	NC	X	X		Fault exclusion mech. shaft breakage, positive encoder shaft connection required	90%	99%	90-95%
52	SIN/COS	Incremental	NC	X	X			n.a.	99%	95-99%
4	SIN/COS	NC	1 x Bero	X	X			n.a.	99%	90-95%
50	SIN/COS	NC	2 x Bero 90°	X	X			n.a.	99%	95-99%
55	SIN/COS	HTL	NC	X	X			n.a.	99%	95-99%
59	SIN/COS	Resolver	NC	X	X			n.a.	99%	99%





No.	Type Encoder to interface X31/32	Type Encoder to interface X31/34	Type Encoder to X 23	Safe speed	Safe direction	Safe position	Fault exclusion	DC		
								1-channel partial system	2-channel partial system dynamic	2-channel partial system non- dynamic (standstill monitoring)
66	SIN/COS	SSI	NC	X	X	X		n.a.	99%	95-99%
8	SSI	NC	2 x Bero 90°	X	X	X		n.a.	99%	90-95%
63	SSI	SIN/COS	NC	X	X	X		n.a.	99%	95-99%
60	SSI	Resolver	NC	X	X	X		n.a.	99%	95-99%
67	SSI	SSI	NC	X	X	X		n.a.	99%	90-95%
61	NC	SIN/COS	NC	X	X		Fault exclusion mech. shaft breakage, positive encoder shaft connection required	90%	99%	90-95%
57	NC	Resolver	NC	X	X		Fault exclusion mech. shaft breakage, positive encoder shaft connection required	90%	99%	90-95%



No.	Type <i>Encoder to interface X31/32</i>	Type <i>Encoder to interface X31/34</i>	Type <i>Encoder to X 23</i>	Safe speed	Safe direction	Safe position	Fault exclusion	DC		
								1-channel partial system	2-channel partial system dynamic	2-channel partial system non-dynamic (standstill monitoring)
53	NC	HTL	NC	X			Fault exclusion mech. shaft breakage, positive encoder shaft connection required	60%	99%	80-90%
64	NC	SSI	2 x Bero 90°	X	X	X		n.a.	99%	90-95%





13 Switch types





Type	Graphic symbols	Truth table	Logic function	Function block	Function																
1	 eSwitch_1o	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>Ö</td> <td>A</td> </tr> <tr> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> </tr> </table>	Ö	A	0	0	1	1	LD E.1 ST IE.X		Normally open, only shown normally closed	 <p>Normally closed contact Output</p>									
Ö	A																				
0	0																				
1	1																				
2	 sSwitch_1s	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>S</td> <td>A</td> </tr> <tr> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> </tr> </table>	S	A	0	0	1	1	LD E.1 ST IE.X		Normally open, as type 1	 <p>Normally closed contact Output</p>									
S	A																				
0	0																				
1	1																				
3	 eSwitch_2o	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>Ö1</td> <td>Ö2</td> <td>A</td> </tr> <tr> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> </tr> </table>	Ö1	Ö2	A	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	LD E.1 AND E.2 ST IE.X		AND operation of both inputs	 <p>Normally closed 1 Normally closed 2 Output</p>
Ö1	Ö2	A																			
0	0	0																			
1	0	0																			
0	1	0																			
1	1	1																			
4	 eSwitch_2oT	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>Ö1</td> <td>Ö2</td> <td>A</td> </tr> <tr> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> </tr> </table>	Ö1	Ö2	A	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	LD E.1 OR E.2 ST META_EN.1 LD E.1 AND E.2 ST METB_EN.1 LD MET.1 ST IE.X	Time monitoring MET1..MET4	Like 3, but with time monitoring of state changes. In case of signal changes at S or Ö a complementary signal must follow within a period of t=3 s. If not, detect fault and A=0	 <p>Normally closed 1 Normally closed 2 Output max 3 s max 3 s</p>
Ö1	Ö2	A																			
0	0	0																			
1	0	0																			
0	1	0																			
1	1	1																			

Typ e	Graphic symbols	Truth table			Function																															
5	 <p>eSwitch_1s1o</p>	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>S</th> <th>Ö</th> <th>A</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> <td>0</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	S	Ö	A	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	<p>LD E.1 AND NOT E.2 ST IE.X</p>		<p>Monitoring for S=inactive and Ö=active</p>																
S	Ö	A																																		
0	0	0																																		
1	0	0																																		
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
14 Notes on designing, programming, validating and testing safety related applications

The following notes describe the procedure for designing, programming, validating and testing safety related applications

The information should help the user to classify, to easily understand and to use all steps from risk assessment all the way to the system test. For better understanding the respective subjects, the individual steps are explained by means of examples.

14.1 Risk assessment

The manufacturer of a machine must generally guarantee the safety of any machine designed or delivered by him. The assessment of safety must be based on the applicable and appropriate regulations and standards. Objective of the safety assessment and the measures derived from this must be the reduction of risks for persons down to an acceptable minimum.




The risk analysis must account for all operating conditions of the machine, such as operation, setup work and maintenance or installation and decommissioning as well as predictable erroneous operation.

The procedure required for the risk analysis and the measures for reducing such risks can be found in the applicable standards

EN ISO 13849-1 Safety of machines

EN ISO 61508 Functional safety of safety related e/e/p e systems

Risk assessment as per EN ISO 13849-1




S – Severe physical injury
 S1 = minor, reversible injury
 S2 = severe, irreversible injury

F – Frequency and/or duration of exposure to danger
 F1 = rarely, not cyclic
 F2 = frequently up to permanent and/or long duration, cyclic operation

P – Possibility to avoid the danger
 P1 = possible, slow movement / acceleration
 P2 = hardly possible, high acceleration in case of a fault

Risk assessment as per EN ISO 61508



The risks to be examined can also be found in applicable regulations and standards, or must be considered separately by the manufacturer based on his specific knowledge of the machine.

For machines sold within the EU the minimum risks to be examined are specified in the EU machine directive 2006/42/EU or in the latest version of this directive.

Further information concerning the risk assessment and the safe design of machines can be found in the standards

EN 14121 Safety of machines - risk assessment

EN 12100 Safety of machines - basic terms, general design guidelines

Measures to be applied in order to reduce identified risks must at least be of the same level as the danger itself. The regulations and standards specified above contain examples of such measures and the associated requirements.

14.2 Required technical documents

The manufacturer is obliged to supply various technical documents. The minimum extent is also contained in the applicable regulations and standards.

The EU machine directive, for example, requires the delivery of the following documents:

1. The technical file shall comprise the following:
 - a) a construction file including:
 - a general description of the machinery,
 - the overall drawing of the machinery and drawings of the control circuits, as well as the pertinent descriptions and explanations necessary for understanding the operation of the machinery,
 - full detailed drawings, accompanied by any calculation notes, test results, certificates, etc., required to check the conformity of the machinery with the essential health and safety requirements,
 - the documentation on risk assessment demonstrating the procedure followed, including:
 - i) a list of the essential health and safety requirements which apply to the machinery,
 - ii) the description of the protective measures implemented to eliminate identified hazards or to reduce risks and, when appropriate, the indication of the residual risks associated with the machinery,
 - the standards and other technical specifications used, indicating the essential health and safety requirements covered by these standards,
 - any technical report giving the results of the tests carried out either by the manufacturer or by a body chosen by the manufacturer or his authorised representative,
 - a copy of the instructions for the machinery,
 - where appropriate, the declaration of incorporation for included partly completed machinery and the relevant assembly instructions for such machinery,
 - where appropriate, copies of the EC declaration of conformity of machinery or other products incorporated into the machinery,
 - a copy of the EC declaration of conformity;
 - b) for series manufacture, the internal measures that will be implemented to ensure that the machinery remains in conformity with the provisions of this Directive.

Source BGIA Report 2/2008

The documents must be easy to understand and should be written in the language of the corresponding country.


14.3 Necessary steps for draft, realization and testing

The realization of plant sections with safety related function requires special attention in planning, realization and testing. Also for this the standards (see ISO 13849-2 or EN ISO 61508) contain specific guidelines. The effort thereby is orientated on the complexity of the task for system components with safety related function.

For the realization of such functions the PSCBR-series offers safety relevant control and monitoring functions to support the system architecture (architecture Cat. 4 acc. to EN ISO 13849-1) and, above all, the programming language and tested safety functions. Programming uses the form FUP (function plan oriented programming) recommended by the safety standards. It fully meets the requirements on the programming language with limited scope of languages (LVM) for the essential simplifications in documentation and testing. The individual steps in any case require careful planning and analysis of the methods and systems used. Furthermore, the individual steps must be documented in an understandable way.

V-model (simplified)

The implementation of safety related functions requires a structured approach, like the V-model that is exemplary described in applicable standards. The following shows an exemplary approach for applications with modules of the PSCBR-series.



Phases of the V-model

Designation	Description	Validation phase
Specification and validation of all passive and active safety measures.	Design phase Specification of all safety measures to be applied, such as covers, barriers, max. machine parameters, safety related functions, etc.	Testing of all passive and active safety measures for correct implementation and effectiveness.
Specification of the functional safety systems	Specification of the active safety systems and their assignment to the risks to be reduced, such as e.g. reduced speed in setup operation, stop-mode, monitoring of access areas, etc. Specification of the PIR or the demanded SIL for each individual safety function	Testing of all active safety systems regarding effectiveness and compliance with specific parameters, such as e.g. erroneous increased speed, faulty stop, responding of monitoring facilities, etc. by means of practical tests
Specification of software / safety functions	Specification of the functionality of individual safety functions incl. the definition of the shut-down circuit, etc. Definition of parameters for individual safety functions, such as e.g. max. speed, stop ramps and - categories, etc.	Testing of correct implementation of specified functions by analysis FUP programming Validation of application programs and parameters by comparing the validation report with FUP or specifications for parameters
Specification of the hardware	Specification of the system structure and the functions of the individual sensors, command units, control components and actuators regarding their safety functions	Testing of the correct implementation of specifications. Determination of the failure probability or PI by means of analysis of the overall architecture and the characteristic data of all components involved, each related to the individual safety functions
Hard and software design	Actual planning and implementation of system structure / wiring. Actual implementation of safety functions by programming in FUP	nil

14.3.1 Specification of safety requirements (structural schematic)

The safety requirements must be individually analysed on the basis of applicable standards, e.g. product standard.

1	General product and project information
1.1	Product identification
1.2	Author, version, date, document name, file name
1.3	Contents
1.4	Terminology, definitions, glossary
1.5	Version history and changes
1.6	Directives, standards and technical rules relevant to development
2	Functional information on the machine, where relevant to safety
2.1	Intended use and reasonably foreseeable misuse
2.2	Process description (operating functions)
2.3	Operating modes (e.g. setup mode, automatic mode, operation of localized relevance or of parts of the machine)
2.4	Characteristic data, e.g. cycle times, response times, overrun distances
2.5	Other characteristics of the machine
2.6	Safe state of the machine
2.7	Interaction between processes (see also 2.2) and manual actions (repair, setup, cleaning, troubleshooting, etc.)
2.8	Emergency operations
3	Required Performance Level(s) (PL_r)
3.1	Reference to existing documentation concerning the hazard analysis and risk assessment for the machine
3.2	Results of the risk assessment for each identified hazard or hazardous situation and specification of the safety function(s) required in each case for risk reduction

4 Safety functions (information applies to each safety function)

- Description of the function ("input – logic – output") including all functional characteristics (refer also to Tables 5.1 and 5.2)
- Activation/deactivation conditions or events (e.g. operating modes of the machine)
- Behaviour of the machine when the safety function is triggered
- Conditions to be observed for re-starting
- Performance criteria/performance data
- Process (timing behaviour) of the safety function, including response time
- Frequency of actuation (i.e. demand rate), recovery time following demand
- Other data
- Adjustable parameters (where provided)
- Classification and assignment of priorities in the event of simultaneous demand for and processing of multiple safety functions
- Functional concept for separation or independence/freedom of reciprocal action from non-safety functions and further safety functions

5 Required information for the SRP/CS design

- 5.1 Allocation of the SRP/CS and the form of technology by which the safety function is to be implemented; intended equipment
- 5.2 Selection of the Category, designated architecture (structure) in the form of a safety-related block diagram and description
- 5.3 Description of the interfaces (process interfaces, internal interfaces, user interfaces, control and display elements, etc.)
- 5.4 Behaviour at switch-on, implementation of the required starting and restarting behaviour
- 5.5 Performance data: cycle times, response times, etc.
- 5.6 Behaviour of the SRP/CS in the event of component failures and faults (achieve and maintain the safe state), including timing behaviour
- 5.7 Failure modes of components, modules or blocks which are to be considered; where applicable, reasoning for fault exclusions
- 5.8 Concept for implementation of the detection and control of random and systematic failures (self-tests, test circuits, monitoring arrangements, comparisons, plausibility tests, fault detection by the process, etc.)
- 5.9 Quantitative aspects
 - 5.9.1 Target values for $MTTF_d$ and DC_{avg}

- 5.9.2 Switching frequency of components subject to wear
- 5.9.3 Frequency of measures for fault detection
- 5.9.4 Mission time, where different from the assumption upon which the intended architecture is based (20 years)
- 5.10 Operating and limit data (operating and storage temperature range, humidity class, IP degree of protection, resistance values for shock/vibration/EMC, supply data with tolerances, etc.)
- 5.11 Generic standards to be applied for design (for the equipment, for protection against electric shock/hazardous shock currents, for resistance to environmental conditions, etc.)
- 5.12 Technical and organizational measures for protected access to safety-related parameters and to SRP/CS characteristics (protection against tampering, access protection, program/data protection) and for protection against unauthorized operation (key switch, code, etc.), for example in non-standard operating modes
- 5.13 General technical requirements and organizational framework for commissioning, testing and acceptance, and for maintenance and repair

Source General specification, excerpt from BGIA Report 2/2008 concerning EN ISO 13849-1

Example for an automatic handling machine:

Description of function:

The automatic handling machine serves the purpose of automatically picking up truck cabins of different heights. After being picked up, the height of the cabin is correctly detected, so that within the working area the cabin cannot be lowered below a certain height. Within the working area the automatic machine must not exceed a maximum speed. Once the cabin has been completely finished, it is put down at the end of the processing line and the automatic handling machine moves along a return track back to the beginning of the track to pick up the next cabin.

Limits of the machine:

Spatial limits: The working area must provide sufficient space for the workers, so that they are able to carry out all necessary work on the cabin..... In the return pass there must be sufficient space for the empty suspension gear of the automatic handler...

Temporal limits: Description of lifetime, description of ageing processes, which could cause changes of machine parameters, (e.g. brakes). Monitoring mechanisms must be implemented for such cases.

Limits of use: The automatic machine automatically fetches new cabins and moves these through a processing area. Workers work in the processing area etc.

The following operating modes are intended: Setup operation, automatic operation and service operation ... etc.

Identification of dangers:

The following dangers are of relevance with the automatic handling machine:

Danger 1: Crushing by cabin / lifting beam falling down

Danger 2: Impact by moving cabin / lifting beam

Danger 3: Crushing by too fast lowering of the cabin in case of a fault

Danger 4:.....

Risk analysis:

G1: The weight of cabin and lifting beam is so high, that it will cause irreversible crushing or even fatalities.

G2: The moving cabin/lifting beam may cause impacts that can lead to irreversible injuries.

G3:

Risk assessment

A risk reduction is required under due consideration of all operating conditions.

Inherently (risk from the project) safe design

Movement of the cabin in direction x and y within the working area cannot be avoided. In the processing area the cabin must be moved up/down ...

The following measures can be applied:














Avoid dangers caused by too fast movements

Avoid dangers caused by too small distances

.....

Example for a risk analysis:

Risk analysis

Safety proof for declaration of manufacturer			Machine type Packaging plant	Order-Number 200-402					
			Customer	Created: Michael Duessel Oct. 16. 2005 Page 1 of 4					
Operating status	Endangered by		Result or protection objective	Solution	Start Cl.	St. Cat.	Standards and directives used	Notes/criteria for commissioning and testing	tested
	Short description	Check							on by
			Linear units						
Automatic and manual mode	Pinching Getting caught Being pulled in	  	Protection against pinching, getting caught and being pulled in required for: - Linear movement in direction X - Linear movement in direction Y	Protective covering 2 m high, with spot welded grid MW 40 mm Safety door with safety door switch			EN 292-2 sect. 3.2 EN 294 sect. 4.5.1	Protective covering present? Tightly bolted to the machine? ES-function tested -Machine must stop immediately when the door is opened	
			Tensioning cylinder / sword						
Automatic and manual mode	Pinching Punching		Protection against pinching and punching required for: - pneumatic linear movement	Protective covering 2 m high, with spot welded grid MW 40 mm			EN 292-2 sect. 3.2 EN 294 sect. 4.5.1	Protective covering present? Tightly bolted to the machine?	
			Centring with pressing plate						
Automatic and manual mode	Crushing Getting caught Being pulled in	  	Protection against pinching, getting caught and being pulled in required for: - pneumatic slewing movement	Protective covering 2 m high, with spot welded grid MW 40 mm Safety door with safety door switch			EN 292-2 sect. 3.2 EN 294 sect. 4.5.1	Protective covering present? Tightly bolted to the machine? ES-function tested -Machine must stop immediately when the door is opened	
			Closing rollers						
Automatic and manual mode	Crushing Getting caught Being pulled in	  	Protection against pinching, getting caught and being pulled in required for: - pneumatic linear movement	Protective covering 2 m high, with spot welded grid MW 40 mm Protective covering made of sheet metal or perforated sheet metal. Gaps and hole size < 8 mm			EN 292-2 sect. 3.2 EN 294 sect. 4.5.1	Protective covering present? Protective covering present? Tightly bolted to the machine?	
		  		pneumatische Linearbewegung			gitter MW 40 mm. Schutzabdeckung aus Blech bzw. Lochblech, Spalte und Lochgröße < 8mm		

Verwendete Normen und Richtlinien	Kriterien
N 292-2 bs. 3.2 N 294 bs. 4.5.1	Schutz vorhanden der Maschine ES-Funktion -Maschine anhalten geöffnet
N 292-2 bs. 3.2 bs. 4.5.1	Schutz vorhanden der Maschine schränkt
N 292-2 bs. 3.2 N 294 bs. 4.5.1	Schutz vorhanden der Maschine schränkt ES-Funktion -Maschine anhalten geöffnet
N 292-2 bs. 3.2 N 294 Abs. 4.5.1	Schutz vorhanden der Maschine deckung Festnahme verschl

14.3.2 Specification of the functional safety system

Derived from the general danger and risk analysis for the machine, the active safety functions must be identified and specified.

Active safety functions are, e.g. safely reduced speed under certain system conditions, monitored stop and standstill functions, area monitoring facilities, processing of monitoring facilities like light grid, switching mats, etc.

The safety functions must each be delimited and the specific requirements in function and safety level must be defined.

14.3.2.1 Definition of safety functions

The definition of the safety function must:

specify the risk to be covered

describe the exact function

list all sensors, command equipment involved

specify the control units

designate the shut-down circuit mentioned.

. The definition should serve as basis for the specification of the hardware and software design.

For each of the safety functions defined this way one may need to determine parameters to be used, like e.g. max. system speed in setup operation, etc.

Examples for safety functions:

SF1: STO (safely switched off torque) to protect against safe starting


SF2: Safe speeds

SF3: Safe positions

SF4:.....

14.3.2.2 Required performance level (PLr) (additional emergency stop)

The required performance level must now be determined on basis of the safety functions SF1.... recognized above. The example below shows the decision path.



Example for SF1: Result PF = d (source Sistema)

14.3.2.3 Example – Specification of safety functions in form of a table

Cons.-No.	Safety function	Ref from GFA	Pl _r	Measuring value /sensor	Implementation of software	Nominal parameters	Input/activation	Response/output
1.1	Limitation of max. travel speed to limitation of the maximum speed	2.3	e	1 x WCS absolute encoder 1 x Incremental encoder on motor / drive wheel	Monitoring by means of tested safety function SLS for fixed limits	550mm/s Fault distance monitoring 200mm	Permanently Reset: Acknowledgement button	Operation stop SF 1.7.1
1.2	Limitation of max. travel speed in working area of workers Monitoring of the maximum speed to < 0.33 m/s	2.4	e	1 x WCS absolute encoder 1 x Incremental encoder on motor / drive wheel	Monitoring by means of tested safety function SLS for fixed limits	60 mm/s Fault distance monitoring 200mm	Identification of worker's work area via position of carriage AND NOT Setup Reset: Acknowledgement button	SF 1.7.1
1.3	Limitation of max. travel speed in setup operation Monitoring of the maximum speed to < 0.07 m/s	3.1	d	1 x WCS absolute encoder 1 x Incremental encoder on motor / drive wheel	Monitoring by means of tested safety function SLS for fixed limits	70mm/s Fault distance monitoring 200mm	Operating mode Setup AND button "Bridge safety" Reset: Acknowledgement button	SF 1.7.1
1.4	Collision protection of carriage Monitoring of the distances between carriages for minimum distance by means of redundant laser distance measurement	2.5	d	2 x Laser distance measuring facilities	Monitoring of distances by means of tested SAC function. The analog distance measurements are reciprocally compared for max. tolerance (diagnose of analog sensor) M' monitored for minimum value (SAC function) Min distance value 25% of the max. value of the measuring device.		Carriage inside worker's working range Reset: Acknowledgement button	SF 1.7.1
1.6.1	Monitoring of carriage sensor system Muting management of the two carriage sensors	5.1	e	1 x WCS absolute encoder 1 x Incremental encoder on motor / drive wheel	Muting of diagnoses for both carriage sensors by means of tested SCA function Muting is started before each gap, a faulty encoder value will be temporarily suppressed. Within the gap an encoder value outside 2 to 160000mm will cause muting.		Pos 1 (7626 - 7850) Pos 2 (11030-1263) Pos 3 (75134-5338) Pos 4 (145562-145622) Pos 5 (143935-143995) Pos 6 (80000-80060)	SF 1.6.2

14.3.3 Software specification

The software specification refers to the previous specification of the safety functions. It can also be replaced by a correspondingly worked out specification of the safety functions, as far as this contains all specifications (see example under 14.3.2.3).

However, it is recommended to prepare an extracted list. This list should contain the following data:

Designation of safety function

Description of function

Parameters, as far as available

Triggering event / operating status

Response / output

The specification in detail should be suitable for later validation of the programming.

Example of software specification

Con s.- No.	Safety function	PIr	Measuring value /sensor	Solution new	Input/activation	Response/output
1.4	Monitoring V_Rope to V_Nominal Monitoring of differences between speed of main drive and rope drive for maximum value	d	Digital incremental encoder, tachometer generator rope sheave	Monitoring by means of tested function SLS + SAC with comparison of speed ranges /analog value ranges = comparison for diagnose of the speed detection Shut-down dual-channel new (see below)	Permanently Reset: Acknowledgement button	Operation stop SF 1.3.1
1.6	Backstop Monitoring for reversing	d	Mechanical limit switch 22S2 Digital incremental encoder	Monitoring by means of tested function direction monitoring SDI	EMERGENCY (auxiliary contact 28K4 – reversing) Reset: Acknowledgement button	Operation stop SF 1.3.1
1.15	Step-by-step shut-down 3 Activation of the safety brake	e	-	Processing of SF in Safe PLC	SF 1.2 SF 1.3.2 SF 1.7 SF 1.8	Setting the safety brake
1.8	Standstill functional	d	Digital incremental encoder	Standstill monitoring by means of tested function SOS	Regulator lock OR Set service brake	SF 1.15/ Set safety brake
1.9	direction monitoring	e	Digital incremental encoder,	Monitoring by means of tested function direction monitoring SDI	28K1 = FORW. 28K2 = BACK = safe <signals from control "Frey"'''	Operation stop SF 1.3.1

14.3.4 Hardware specification

The hardware specification should describe the entire system design and, in particular, the components used with their specific characteristic data. The hardware specification serves as basis for the determination of the achieved safety level based on the architecture and the characteristic data of all devices involved in a safety function.

Furthermore, the hardware specification should also specify the design measures applied for protecting against systematic and common cause faults.

14.3.4.1 Selection of SRP/CS and operating means

The selection of SRP/CS (Safety related parts of control system) is most suitable to achieve the intended safety level and should be made for any safety function. The components with safety relevant function must be designated in a total overview of the system structure and are to be assigned to the individual safety functions. The safety related code numbers must be determined for these components.

The code numbers cover the following values:


MTTFd = mean time to failure, the mean time until a danger imposing failure)

DC avg = Mean diagnostic coverage

CCF = common cause failure, a failure caused on a common cause

For an SRP/CS both the software and systematic faults must be taken into consideration.

An analysis of the SRP/CS participating in the safety function must generally be performed in accordance with the schematic Sensor / PES / Actuator.



14.3.4.2 Example for hardware specification

Safety function		Safely reduced speed	SF 2.2	Safely monitored limited speed with door open							
Type	Designation	Function	Design	Characteristic data							Note
				Architecture	MTTFD [Years]	PFH [1/h]	B10d	Source	DC [%]	Source	
Sensor	Sensor 1	Door lock – Monitoring of the access door	A 3.1	4			100000	Data sheet	99	Inst. manual op. PSCBR	
	Sensor 2.1	Incremental encoder – Motor feedback SIN/COS	G 1.1	4	30			Gen. specification	99	Inst. manual op. PSCBR	Cat. 4 in connection with selection PSCBR
PES	Safety PLC	Central safety PLC for control and evaluation of safety relevant functions	A 4.1			1,4 E-8		Data sheet PSCBR			
Actuator	STO	Safe Torque Off on inverter	A 5.1	4	150			Data sheet inverter	99	Inst. manual op. PSCBR	Cat. 4 in connection with dual-channel
	Mains contactor	Contacteur in mains line of inverter	K 5.1	4			20 E6	Data sheet contactor	99	Inst. manual op. PSCBR	Cat. 4 in connection with dual-channel


14.3.4.3 Consideration of systematic failures

Within the hardware specification one must also consider systematic failures.

Examples for measures against systematic failures:

Power drop during operation. If this causes a danger, a power drop must be considered a operating status. The SRP/CD must be able to cope with this condition, so that a safe state is maintained.

Measures against systematic failures acc. to appendix G DIN EN ISO 13849-9



Source BGIA Report 2/2008

Fault exclusions

If fault exclusions are made for certain devices or system components, these must be individually nominated and specified.

Fault exclusions may be e.g. mech. shaft breakage, sticking of switching contacts, short-circuits in cables and lines, etc.

The permissibility of fault exclusions must be justified, e.g. by referencing to permissible fault exclusions acc. to applicable standards, e.g. EN ISO 13849-1)

If these fault exclusions require special measures, these must be mentioned.

Examples for fault exclusions and associated measures:

- Positive connection for mechanical shaft connections
- Dimensioning based on sufficient theoretical bases in case of breakage of components in the safety chain.
- Positively guided connection with forced separation in case of sticking of switching contacts.
- Protected routing within switchgear in case of short-circuit in cables and lines, as well as routing of cables in cable ducts – especially for use in elevator technology acc. to EN81.

14.3.5 Hard and software design

The performance targets from the hardware and software specification are implemented in the actual system design.

The performance targets for the components to be used and their wiring from the hardware specification must also be met, the same applies for the performance targets for fault exclusions. Both must be achieved and documented with appropriate means.

In the software one must also account for and completely implement the targets from the software specification.

Furthermore one must consider the superimposed targets placed on the software by safety related programming. These are among others:

Modular and clear program structure

Assignment of functions to the safety functions

Understandable representation functions by:

Unambiguous designations

Understandable comments

Use of tested functions / function modules, as far as this is possible

Defensive programming

14.3.6 Testing of the hardware design

After completing the planning the hardware design must be examined for compliance with the targets from the hardware specification.

Furthermore, one must check the compliance with the specified safety level for each safety function by using suitable analyses. The analysis methods have been described in applicable standards (e.g. EN 13849-1).

Analysis of wiring diagram

Compliance with the targets set under safety related aspects can be checked by means of the wiring diagram and the bill of materials. The following must be checked in particular:

the correct wiring of components as specified,

the dual-channel structure, as far as specified

the non-reactivity of parallel, redundant channels.

The use of components as specified

The checks should be made by understandable analysis.

14.3.6.1 Iterative testing of the achieved safety level


The achieved safety level must be determined by means of the circuit structure (= architecture single-channel (dual-channel / with or without diagnose), the characteristic device data (manufacturer's data or appropriate sources) and the diagnostic coverage (manufacturer's data PES or general sources). Appropriate measures can be taken from the underlying safety standard.

A calculation acc. to EN ISO 13849-1 shall serve as an example:


Safety function:

Safely reduced speed with access door open

Structural diagram:



Safety related structural diagram:



Calculation acc. to EN 13849-1:

Channel A – shut-down via mains contactor:

Component	MTTFD [years]	DC
Door closer	B10d = 100000 Nop = 30/AT = 10000/year(309 AT/year)	DCSwitch = 99%

$$MTTFD = \frac{B10d}{0,1 * Nop} = 100 \square\square\square\square$$

SIN/COS encoder:	MTTFD_SinCos = 30 years	DCEncoder = 99%
------------------	-------------------------	-----------------

PES	PFH = 1.4 * 10 ⁻⁸	DCPES = 99%
-----	------------------------------	-------------

$$MTTFD = \frac{1}{8760 * PFH} = 8115 \square\square\square\square$$

Mains contactor	B10d = 20 * 106 Nop = 20/AT = 3990/year(309 AT/year)	DCPES = 60%
-----------------	---	-------------

$$MTTFD = \frac{B10d}{0,1 * Nop} = 55 \square\square\square\square$$

$$MTTFD_A = \frac{1}{\frac{1}{MTTFD_Türz} + \frac{1}{MTTFD_SinCos} + \frac{1}{MTTFD_PES} + \frac{1}{MTTFD_Netzsch}} = 33 \square\square\square\square$$

Channel B – shut-down via STO/inverter:

Component	MTTFD [years]	DC
Door closer	B10d = 100000 Nop = 30/AT = 10000/year(309 AT/year)	DCSwitch = 99%
	$MTTFD = \frac{B10d}{0,1 * Nop} = 100 \square\square\square\square$	
SIN/COS encoder:	MTTFD_SinCos = 30 years	DCEncoder = 99%
PES	PFH = 1.4 * 10-8	DCPES = 99%
	$MTTFD = \frac{1}{8760 * PFH} = 8115 = 1 \square\square\square\square$	
STO/ inverter	MTTFD_STO = 150 years	DCPES = 90%

$$MTTFD_A = \frac{1}{\frac{1}{MTTFD_Türz} + \frac{1}{MTTFD_SinCos} + \frac{1}{MTTFD_PES} + \frac{1}{MTTFD_Netzsch}} = 20 \square\square\square\square$$

Resulting PI for both channels:

Symmetry of both channels:

$$MTTFD = \frac{2}{3} \left[MTTFD_A + MTTFD_B - \frac{1}{\frac{1}{MTTFD_A} + \frac{1}{MTTFD_B}} \right] = 27 \square\square\square\square$$

DC mean value

$$MTTFD = \frac{\frac{DCSwitch}{MTTFD_Türz} + \frac{DCSinCos}{MTTFD_SinCos} + \frac{DCPES}{MTTFD_PES} + \frac{DCSchütz}{MTTFD_Schütz} + \frac{DCSTO}{MTTFD_STO}}{\frac{1}{MTTFD_Türz} + \frac{1}{MTTFD_SinCos} + \frac{1}{MTTFD_PES} + \frac{1}{MTTFD_Netzsch}} = 98\%$$

PI

MTTFD_STO = 27 years = average
 DC avg = 98 % = average

PI =“d“ (from TEN ISO 13849-1, tables 5, 6 and 7)

In this case the B10d value of the door monitoring feature is determining for PI. If an even higher safety level is to be reached a correspondingly higher qualitative switch is to be used.

Note:

The PI can also be determined with the program tool "Sistema" from BGIA.

14.3.7 Verification software(program) and parameters

Verification takes place in two steps.

Checking the FUP with respect to the specified functionality.

Checking the FUP against the AWL-listing of the validation report, or the default parameters against the one listed in the validation report.

14.3.7.1 Checking FUP

The programmed FUP must be compared with the defaults in the specification.

Note:

The comparison is all the more efficient the more clearly the programming has been structured with respect to the safety functions.

Example:


Safety function:

1.1 Limitation of the max. travel speed of the carriage to 1.1 VMax

Monitoring of the maximum speed to < 1.1 VMax

FW Max Speed OK (ID 548) (is bridged by available gap):

FW Max Speed is permanently activated and responds when a speed of 550 mm/s is exceeded.




Safety function:

Limitation of max. travel speed in carriage in the worker's area:

Monitoring of the maximum speed to < 0.33 m/s

Safe Speed OK (ID 2124) (is bridged by available gap):

Safe Speed OK responds when the the safe speed SLS (ID 2090) is exceeded in the worker's area and during setup work.



Parameter SLS Safe Speed:


60 mm/s, no further parameters

Safety function:

1.7.3 Carriage shut.down

Shut down of travel system and deactivation of brakes

Shut down on carriage



The carriage is switched off via two outputs (EAA1.5 ID 257 and 1.6 ID 261).
 The brakes are released via two outputs (EAA1.3 ID 253 and 1.4 ID 249).
 The PLC receives a message concerning bit 50 (ID 600)
 In case of an emergency stop the shut-down takes place immediately.
 Lift

Safety function

Emergency stop switch inputs and shut-down outputs.

1.1 Emergency stop head control

Dual-channel emergency stop with pulse monitoring

If an emergency stop is triggered at the imposed control, this emergency stop can be bridged if the approval 'Bridge safety' has been issued.

Emergency stop button head control



Emergency stop contacts from emergency stop relay with pulsing from the PSCBR

14.3.7.2 Validation of FUP against AWL and parameters by means of validation report.

The programming that took place in the FUP must be compared with the AWL-listing of the validation report.

Example AWL-listing in validation report

Validation report

OLC-program

Name: <leer>

Index	Command	Operand	validated
1	S1	SLI_EN.1	
2	S1	SLI_EN.2	
3	S1	SLI_EN.3	
4	S1	SCA_EN.1	
5	S1	SCA_EN.2	
6	S1	SCA_EN.3	
7	S1	SLS_EN.2	
8	S1	SCA_EN.4	
9	S1	SLS_EN.3	
10	S1	SLS_EN.4	
11	S1	SLI_EN.5	
12	SQH		
13	LD	E0.1	
14	ST	MX.2	
15	SQC		
16	SQH		
17	LD	E0.3	
18	AND	E0.4	
19	ST	MX.3	
20	SQC		

Step-by-step testing is recommended. The test all the batter, the more structured the programming in FUP has been made.

After checking the program one must also check the parameters against the targets set in the specifications by means of comparison.

Example SLS:

Validation report

Safe Limited Speed (SLS)

Index	Parameters	Value	validated
SLS -			
0	Chosen axis:	1	
	Speed threshold:	2	0
SLS -			
1	Chosen axis:	1	
	Speed threshold:	500	0
SLS -			
2	Chosen axis:	1	
	Speed threshold:	2	0
	Acceleration threshold	2	0
SLS -			
3	Chosen axis:	1	
	Speed threshold:	2	0
	Assigned SSX-ramp	0	

Example encoder configuration:

Validation report

Axis configuration / sensor interface

Axis 1

General parameters

Measuring distance: 500 0

Type: Rotational

No

Position processing: Active

Maximum speed: 2000 0

Incremental shut-down: 10000 0

Shut-down speed: 100 0

Sensors	0		0	
Type:	SSI-standard		SSI-standard	
Format:	Binary		Binary	
Direction of rotation:	Ascending		Ascending	
Supply voltage:	0		0	
Resolution:	1024	Steps/1000mm	64	Steps/1000mm
Offset:	0	Steps	0	Steps

General parameters correctly configured

Parameter sensor 1 correct

Parameter sensor 2 correct

14.3.8 Performance of the system test / FIT (fault injection test)

For the FIT the manufacturer must prepare a complete list of the functions to be tested. This list includes the defined safety functions as well as the fault test for checking the right response of the SRP/CS to this fault

Example test list:

No	Setup	Test	Result
1	Test SLS for max. speed in setup operation Activate setup operation Travel with maximally allowed speed	- Diagnose of the actual speed versus the SLS limit - Manipulation of the setup speed beyond the permitted reduced speed	
2	Test SSX for Stop-category 2 Travel with max. speed Actuate the emergency stop	- Diagnose of the SSX-ramp against the actual deceleration ramp - Setting an impermissible weak deceleration - Moving the axis after standstill is reached by manipulating the drive	
3	Test of the dual-channel door monitoring Select operating mode for setup operation	Diagnose of inactive monitoring with door closed (using diagnostics function FUP) Diagnose of active monitoring with door open (using diagnostics function FUP) Disconnecting one channel and opening the door Generate cross-shorting between both inputs	

Appendix

Appendix A – Classification of switch types

General note:

The individual switches of the following input elements can be assigned to the digital inputs DI1 to DI8 as desired.

Enable switch

Switch type	Comment	Classification PI acc. to EN ISO 13849-1	Classification SIL acc. to EN 61508
1 normally closed	Enable switch standard	PI d	SIL 2
1 normally open	Enable switch standard	PI d	SIL 2
2 normally closed	Enable switch higher requirements	PI e	SIL 3
2 normally closed time monitored	Enable switch monitored	PI e	SIL 3

Emergency Stop

Switch type	Comment	Classification category	Classification SIL
1 normally closed	Emergency Stop standard	PI d ¹⁾	SIL 2
2 normally closed	Emergency stop higher requirements	PI e	SIL 3
2 normally closed time monitored	Emergency Stop monitored	PI e	SIL 3

¹⁾ Fault exclusions and boundary conditions acc. to EN 13849-2 must be observed!

Door monitoring

Switch type	Comment	Classification category	Classification SIL
2 normally closed	Door monitoring higher requirements	PI e	SIL 3
2 normally closed time monitored	Door monitoring monitored	PI e	SIL 3
1 normally open + 1 normally closed	Door monitoring higher requirements	PI e	SIL 3
1 normally open + 1 normally closed time monitored	Door monitoring monitored		SIL 3
2 normally open + 2 normally closed	Door monitoring higher requirements	PI e	SIL 3
2 normally open + 2 normally closed time monitored	Door monitoring monitored	PI e	SIL 3
3 normally closed	Door monitoring higher requirements	PI e	SIL 3
3 normally closed time monitored	Door monitoring monitored	PI e	SIL 3

Two-hand button

Switch type	Comment	Classification category	Classification SIL
2 two-way switch	Two-hand button higher requirements	Type III C PI e	SIL3
2 normally open	Two-hand button monitored	Type III A PI e	SIL1

Note: With these inPort elements a fixed pulse assignment takes place, which cannot be influenced by the user!

Light curtain

Switch type	Comment	Classification category	Classification SIL
2 normally closed	Light curtain higher requirements	PI e	SIL 3
2 normally closed time monitored	Light curtain monitored	PI e	SIL 3
1 normally open + 1 normally closed	Light curtain higher requirements	PI e	SIL 3
1 normally open + 1 normally closed time monitored	Light curtain monitored	PI e	SIL 3

Mode selector switch

Switch type	Comment	Classification category	Classification SIL
2 positions	Mode selector switch monitored	PI e	SIL 3
3 positions	Mode selector switch monitored	PI e	SIL 3

Safety note: When changing the status of the switch the SafePLC program to be created must ensure that the outPorts of the module are deactivated (note: Standard 60204-Part1-Paragraph 9.2.3).

Sensor

Switch type	Comment	Classification category	Classification SIL
1 normally closed	Sensor input standard	PI d	SIL 2
1 normally open	Sensor input standard	PI d	SIL 2
2 normally closed	Sensor input higher requirements	PI e	SIL 3
2 normally closed time monitored	Sensor input monitored	PI e	SIL 3
1 normally open + 1 normally closed	Sensor input higher requirements	PI e	SIL 3
1 normally open + 1 normally closed time monitored	Sensor input monitored	PI e	SIL 3

Start / reset element

Switch type	Comment	Classification category	Classification SIL
1 normally open	Alarm reset standard (evaluation of edge)	--	--
1 normally open	Logic reset standard	PI d	SIL 2
1 normally open	Start monitoring standard (optional function)	--	--

Note:

The alarm reset input can be operated with 24V continuous voltage and is edge triggered.



EU Declaration of Conformity for Safety Components as defined by the EC-directive

- Maschines 2006/42/EG
Appendix IV

The safety component

Manufacture: ACE Schmersal Eletroeletrônica Industrial Ltda.

Type: PSCBR-C-10, PSCBR-C-10-SDM1, PSCBR-C-10-SDM1-2, PSCBR-C-10-SDM2, PSCBR-C-10-SDM2-2, PSCBR-C-10-SDM2A, PSCBR-E-31-12DI-10DIO

has been developed, designed and manufactured in compliance with the above mentioned directive as well as the EC-directive

- EC-EMC directive 2004/108/EC dated December 15, 2004

in the sole responsibility of

Rodovia Boituva - Porto Feliz, km 12 – Jd. Esplanada CEP: 18550-000 Boituva/SP

Description of function:

Modular, freely programmable safety control for monitoring drive systems suitable up to SIL 3 IEC 61508, or PI e acc. to EN ISO 13849

For the safety component an

EC Pattern Evaluation Test, Reg.-No. 01/205/ 5014/10,

by the

TÜV Rhineland Industry Service GmbH,
Alboinstr. 56,
D-12103 Berlin,
identification number Notified Body NB 0035

was carried out.

The following harmonized standards were applied:

- EN ISO 13849-1:2008
Safety of machines, safety related parts of controls

Part 1: General design principles

- EN ISO 13850:2008
Safety of machines; EMERGENCY Stop, design principles
- EN 574:1996 + A1:2008
Safety of machines; two-hand controls, functional aspects, design principles
- EN 55 011 : 2007
Industrial, scientific and medical equipment - radio interferences - limit values and measuring methods

The following non-harmonised standards were also applied:

- EN 62061:2006
Safety of machines, functional safety of safety related electric, electronic and programmable electronic control systems

A complete technical documentation is available. Responsible for technical documentation:

João Pedro Alvise, Rodovia Boituva - Porto Feliz, km 12 – Boituva/SP.

The operating instructions belonging to the safety component is available:

- in the original version



Boituva, June 14, 2014

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Marco Antonio De Dato
Engineering Manager